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Abstract
CHAK HUNG JACK CHENG: Labor Market Rigidities and Ramifications of
the Asian Financial Crisis: What Can We Learn from Hong Kong’s Experience?.
(Under the direction of Michael K. Salemi.)
The economic downfall experienced by Hong Kong during the Asian financial crisis is
bewildering since Hong Kong did not undergo large currency devaluations as did other affected
Asian economies. The purpose of this dissertation is to ascertain whether the large impact of
the Asian crisis on the Hong Kong economy can be attributed to labor market frictions.
In the first part of this dissertation, I develop and estimate a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model with sticky wages based on the work by Cheng and Salemi (2010). The
chief findings of this analysis are that nominal wages in Hong Kong are very sticky and the
significant rise in unemployment after the crisis can be predominantly ascribed to wage setting
frictions. However, wage rigidities are not responsible for the large decline in output. The
rationale behind this result is that labor compensations account for a rather small share of
total production costs in Hong Kong. Hence, changes in wage costs have only a limited effect
on prices and output.
In the second part of this work, I estimate a standard search-matching model. I find that a
standard search model cannot explain the data as well as the sticky wage model. In particular,
volatility of wages implied by the search model is much higher than that in the data.
Finally, in the last portion of this work, I add wage stickiness to the standard search model
to further determine the role of wage rigidity in explaining the Hong Kong data. I find that
incorporating wage rigidity into the search model can improve the model’s ability to explain
the volatility of nominal wages. Also, by conducting counterfactual experiments on the sticky
wage search model, I confirm that wage rigidity significantly amplifed the impact of the Asian
financial crisis on the Hong Kong economy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In mid-1997, Hong Kong and several other Asian economies, including Thailand and South
Korea, experienced a common financial crisis. Unlike Thailand and South Korea, Hong Kong
was able to avoid currency devaluations because it pegs its currency to the US dollar. Never-
theless, the impact of the Asian crisis on the Hong Kong economy was severe and persistent.
Output in Hong Kong declined drastically following the crisis. And accompanying the fall in
output was a significant rise in the unemployment rate.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the detrended output and the unemployment rate series of Hong
Kong from 1996 to 2001. Output in Hong Kong plummeted by approximately 19 percentage
points, relative to its trend, from the third quarter of 1997 to the first quarter of 1999. The
unemployment rate rose by about 4 percent over the same period. The deep impact of the crisis
on the Hong Kong economy is rather puzzling since the mechanism of liability dollarization,
which is widely believed to have exacerbated the output contractions in several Asian countries
during the crisis, is virtually nonexistent in Hong Kong.1 Therefore, it is imperative to ask
why the impact of the Asian crisis on this small open economy was nonetheless devastating.
One possible explanation for the profound influence of the crisis on the Hong Kong economy
is provided by Yip (2005). Yip argues that prices and wages in Hong Kong adjust sluggishly to
economic events. Thus, when a shock hits the economy, adjustments to the shock will mostly
take place in quantity variables, such as real output and employment. As a result, Hong
1See Cook (2004).
Kong has to suffer a dramatic decrease in output during a financial crisis. In fact, Shimer
(2010) makes a similar argument in a recent paper. He suggests that wage rigidities could be
responsible for the jobless recovery following the recent US financial crisis. In this dissertation,
I attempt to test the wage stickiness hypothesis. In particular, I ask two important questions.
First, are nominal wages in Hong Kong sluggish? Second, can the fall in output and the rise
in the unemployment rate in Hong Kong during the Asian crisis be attributed to the wage
adjustment process?
In the literature, there is little concensus on the degree of wage flexibility in Hong Kong.
On one hand, a number of authors, including Razzak (2003), Schellekens (2005) and Cheng
and Salemi (2010), agree that nominal wages in Hong Kong are sticky. Genberg and Pauwels
(2005) also argue that the rise in Hong Kong’s unemployment during the Asian crisis is related
to the slow wage adjustment process. On the other hand, a recent paper by Pauwels and Zhang
(2008) argues that nominal wages in Hong Kong are flexible.
Figure 1.2 depicts the quarterly growth rates of wages and prices in Hong Kong and provides
a rough idea of how quickly nominal wages in Hong Kong responded to the Asian crisis. The
figure shows that the price level declined sharply after 1997. However, nominal wages seemed
to stay at the same level over the crisis period. As a result, real wages continued to climb after
the crisis in spite of the significant increase in unemployment. The figure suggests that wages
in Hong Kong are somewhat sticky.2
A large number of papers have incorporated different types of frictions into a standard real
business cycle model to explain the large decline in output during a financial crisis.3 However,
to my knowledge, very few papers have examined the role of labor market frictions. In addition,
little work has been done to explain the behavior of the labor market, especially the movement
in the unemployment rate, during a financial crisis. This paper attempts to fill these gaps in
2Rigidity in the wage process can come from different sources, such as the type of labor contracts, culture,
institutional factors and differences in human capital accumulation. See Schmieder and von Wachter (2010).
However, investigating the main source of wage rigidity in Hong Kong is not within the scope of this paper. In
this paper, I refer to the degree of wage rigidity as the Calvo probability of being able to adjust wages in each
period.
3See Meza and Quintin (2007), Kehoe and Rhul (2009).
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the literature.
To address the questions of interest, I develop and estimate a small open economy model
with unemployment. The model is a modified version of the one developed by Cheng and
Salemi (2010). To model unemployment, I adopt the union bargaining mechanism used by
Peretto (2006) and Salemi (2007). Unemployment occurs in equilibrium because the bargained
nominal wage is above the labor market clearing level. I choose the union bargaining model
because it gives wage stickiness a central role in explaining unemployment.4 This feature of
the model is particularly desirable, given our observation that the high unemployment rate
during the Asian crisis seems to be associated with the slow adjustment of wages in Hong
Kong.
To capture wage stickiness, I adopt a Calvo-type wage setting process instead of assuming
an ad hoc partial adjustment wage equation. In every period, each firm in the economy
faces a constant probability that it may renegotiate with their workers over nominal wages.
The advantage of using this mechanism is that the Calvo wage parameter provides us with a
measure of the average duration of wage adjustment in Hong Kong, which is one of the primary
interests of this paper.
I find that our theoretical model fits the data well. In particular, it can match the volatilities
of some key variables and the correlations among them in the data. The estimate of the Calvo
wage parameter shows that the wage adjustment process in Hong Kong is very sluggish. The
average duration of wage agreement in Hong Kong is around 12 quarters. Furthermore, when
I simulate the estimated structural shocks experienced by Hong Kong during the Asian crisis,
I find that the fall in Hong Kong output after 1997 is largely caused by export demand shocks
and total factor productivity (TFP) shocks, while the rise in the unemployment rate is mostly
triggered by shocks to export demand, import demand and labor supply.
In addition, by conducting counterfactual experiments, I find that wage rigidity in Hong
Kong amplifies the effect of the crisis shocks on the unemployment rate significantly.5 In
4The terms wage bargaining model and union bargaining model are used interchangeably in this dissertation.
5In this paper, I refer to crisis shocks as all the structural shocks experienced by Hong Kong after the second
quarter of 1997.
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particular, wage rigidity is responsible for more than half (2.5 percentage points) of the increase
in the unemployment rate. Wage stickiness prevents a large decrease in wages during the crisis.
As a result, profit-maximizing firms choose to lay off more workers in order to reduce labor
costs. This leads to a sharp increase in the unemployment rate.
On the other hand, the large decline in Hong Kong ouptut is not related to the wage setting
frictions, which account for an output drop of 1.5 percentage points during the crisis. The
main reason is that, in Hong Kong, labor compensations make up only a small portion of the
total production costs. Firms place a relatively small emphasis on wage costs when they set
prices. Thus, the effect of a change in wages on prices and output is rather limited.
While the union bargaining model is useful for understanding the consequence of wage
rigidities, it ignores the effect of other labor market frictions such as search and matching
frictions. In particular, it does not capture the idea that unemployment might be the result
of a slow job matching process. In reality, it is often difficult for a firm to fill a vacancy or
for a worker to find a suitable job instantly due to the heterogeneity of jobs and workers.
Unemployment can persist even when an economy is recovering from a crisis because the
process of hiring is time consuming. Indeed, the seminal work by Pissarides (1985) implies a
similar point. Thus, a model with search and matching frictions has the potential to explain
the long-lived unemployment in Hong Kong that occured after the Asian crisis. It is important
for us to ask if a standard search model can provide a better fit to the Hong Kong data.
In the second part of this dissertation, I estimate a standard Mortensen-Pissarides type
search model. The search model differs from the union bargaining model in a few aspects.
First, unlike the union bargaining model, there are unfilled vacancies due to search frictions.
Second, in the search model, hiring is costly and time-consuming. The costs of hiring depend
directly on the labor market conditions. Third, wage bargaining is assumed to take place
between a firm and an individual worker, instead of a labor union.
I find that the standard search model does not fit the data as well as the union bargaining
model. Specifically, the search model generates too much volatilities in nominal wages and
consumption. Also, the correlations between output and consumption as well as output and
employment generated by the search model are far from its data counterparts.
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To further confirm the importance of wage rigidity in explaining the Hong Kong data, in
the last part of this dissertation, I introduce wage stickiness to the standard search-matching
model. It is essential and interesting to see if wage rigidity is as important in explanining the
effect of the Asain crisis in a model with search frictions as it does in the union bargaining
model. The analysis shows that adding wage stickiness to the search model improves the
model’s ability to explain the volatilites of wages, consumption and output. Furthermore, the
sticky wage version of the search model appears to fit the data better than the standard version
in terms of the loglikelihood value.
By conducting counterfactual experiments on the sticky-wage search model, I find that wage
rigidity in Hong Kong accounts for a significant amount of the increase in the unemployment
rate during the crisis period. This result is in line with what we obtained from the union
bargaining model and it provides further evidence that wage stickiness played an important
role in the Hong Kong economy during the Asian crisis.
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the related literature. Chap-
ter 3 characterizes the union bargaining model and the estimation methodology and results.
Chapter 4 presents the search and matching model and compares the estimation results with
those from the wage bargaining model. Chapter 5 concludes and discusses possible future
research.
5
Figure 1.1: Departures of Output and the Unemployment Rate from Long Run Values
Figure 1.2: Wage and Price Growth Rates in Hong Kong
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Chapter 2
Related Literature
This paper belongs to the literature that focuses on the effects of sudden stops. This line of
research takes sudden stops as given, and studies their impacts on macroeconomic variables.
This paper is also related to a growing literature that explores the effects of labor market
frictions on business cycle fluctuations.
There exist many theories which seek to explain what precipitates a financial crisis. For in-
stance, Chang and Velasco (2001) argue that illiquidity in the domestic banking sector caused
by a maturity mismatch can potentially set off a financial crisis in an emerging country. Burn-
side et al. (2001) argue that government loan guarantees can trigger a currency mismatch
between banks’ assets and liabilities. Arellano and Mendoza (2003) provide a survey of lit-
erature on sudden stops and argue that collateral constraints are important in generating
them. Mendoza and Smith (2006) show that an equilibrium asset-pricing model with financial
frictions can generate quantitative predictions that resemble the observed features of sudden
stops. However, this paper is entirely agnostic about the cause of a finanical crisis. Instead, it
attempts to account for the deep repercussions of the Asian financial crisis.
A growing number of studies are striving to comprehend the impact of financial crises on
emerging countries. Chari et al. (2005) use a standard neoclassical growth model and show
that a sudden stop of capital inflows is equivalent to an unanticipated increase in government
spending in a closed economy model and, thus, cause an improvement in output. They argue
that frictions are needed for a standard growth model to overcome the positive effect of a
sudden stop on output.
To understand the effects of the Asian financial crisis on East Asian countries, Cook and
Devereux (2006a) develop a standard open economy model with sticky prices. They show that
a standard open economy New Keynesian model can generate responses that match the data
of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia when their model is subjected to an exogenous risk premium
shock. Furthermore, Cook and Devereux (2006b) stress that regional interdependence and the
use of the US dollar in export trading in Asia exacerbated the Asian financial crisis. They
argue, in particular, the slow response of exports to the large real exchange rate depreciations
that occured in the crisis was primarily due to the foreign currency pricing of exports in East
Asia. Nevertheless, these papers do not incorporate any type of labor market frictions into
their models. Consequently, they have entirely ignored the effects of labor market frictions on
the Asian economies during the crisis.
In a recent paper by Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), the authors study the effect of the Mexician
crisis of 1994. They find that both output and total factor productivity decreased significantly
during the crisis, and that there was an accompanying real exchange rate depreciation. Kehoe
and Ruhl develop a real business cycle model with traded and nontraded sectors and show
that their model is able to replicate the responses of the trade balance, the real exchange rate,
and the relative price of nontraded goods, but fails to explain the large decline in GDP and
TFP. They demonstrate that adding labor demand adjustment costs to the firms sector allows
the model to account for the movements in output and TFP, but loses the ability to explain
the variations in other variables at the same time.
Another study related to the impact of the Mexician crisis is conducted by Meza and
Quintin (2007). They argue that capital utilization can account for a large majority of the
unusual drops in TFP during the Mexician crisis. They show that a standard neoclassical
growth model with capital utilization and labor hoarding can predict output drops similar to
what has been observed in the data. While these papers have shown that introducing labor
employment frictions can improve a model’s ability to explain the effects of sudden stops, they
are for the most part silent on the role of wage rigidities during a financial crisis.
Abbritti and Weber (2009), in a recent work, show that a higher degree of real wage
rigidities amplifies the effects of different shocks on the economy and increases the volatility of
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unemployment, while a lower job-finding and separation rate, have the opposite effects. The
intuition behind their results is straightforward. Real wage rigidities limit the movement of
wages and, in turn, limit the movements of marginal cost and prices. Thus, adjustment to
shocks relies heavily on output. In contrast, other labor market rigidities, such as hiring and
firing costs, restrain the adjustment in labor quantities and cause prices to react vigorously to
any changes in the economy.
Numerous papers have considered the importance of labor market frictions in explaining
the observed dynamics of unemployment and inflation in a closed economy setting. Most
of them concentrate on the Mortensen-Pissarides type of search and matching model. For
example, Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) incorporate the search and matching mechanism
into a standard real business cycle model and study the effects of technology shocks on the US
business cycles. Shimer (2005) argues that a standard Mortensen-Pissarides type model cannot
explain the large volatility of unemployment and vacancies observed in the US because it does
not have a strong amplification mechanism. However, Nakajima (2008) develops a search and
matching type model and finds the opposite. He argues that utility from leisure plays a key
role in intensifying the effects of productivity shocks. Hall (2005) stresses that adding real
wage rigidities to a standard Mortensen-Pissarides model can potentially account for the large
movements in the US unemployment and vacancies, while Moyen and Sahuc (2005) develop a
model with sticky prices and labor market rigidites and evaluate its ability to explain the euro
area data.
Moreover, a growing number of papers, such as Christoffel and Linzert (2005), Walsh
(2005), Blanchard and Gali (2009) and Gerlter et al. (2008) introduce search and matching
frictions to the standard New Keynesian model with different price and wage rigidities. They
focus on the implications of labor market frictions for unemployment and inflation dynamics
as well as the impact of a monetary policy shock.
Cheng and Salemi (2010) develop a small open economy model with unemployment and
show how different shocks are responsible for the fluctuations in Hong Kong output and un-
employment. Their work shares similar model specifications with this paper, but they address
a different set of questions. The approach adopted in this paper differs from Cheng and
9
Salemi in one important aspect. They focus on the importance of different structural shocks
in explaining the variations in Hong Kong output and unemployment between 1981 and 2007.
However, in this paper, I attempt to investigate the role of labor market rigidities, not different
structural shocks, in causing the unemployment in Hong Kong during the Asian crisis.
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Chapter 3
Union Bargaining Model
3.1 The Model
In this section, I provide a detailed description of the theoretical model, which is a modified
version of the one developed by Cheng and Salemi (2010). I adjust their model by using a
Calvo-type wage setting mechanism to capture wage stickiness. In every period, each firm
faces a fixed probability that it may bargain with its labor union over the nominal wage.
The unemployment mechanism of the model is similar to that of Peretto (2006) and Salemi
(2007) where unemployment occurs in equilibrium because the bargained wage rate is above
the labor market clearing level, but not due to the search-matching mechanism. Additionally,
the current model is different from the one in Erceg et al. (2000). Their model lacks the
international trade sector and equilibrium unemployment. The current model is made up of
four sectors: households, firms, the government and the international trade. I begin by first
describing the household sector.
3.1.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical and infinitely-lived households on
the unit interval. The preference of the representative household is described by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtΓU
(
Ct
Γ
,
Jt
Γ
)
where Ct and Jt are consumption and leisure respectively. Γ is the population of the represen-
tative household and is normalized to 1. Leisure is defined as Jt = Γ − Ltpet − ΓΩ(Lt, Lt−1).
Lt is labor supply, which is equivalent to the number of household members participating in
the labor market and pet is the probability of finding employment. The product of these two
variables, Ltpet , is the employment of the household. Each household member is endowed with
one unit of time. If a household member who is currently in the labor market and is employed,
she spends all her time working. If the labor market entrant is not employed, she can recover
all her time for leisure activities.1 The household takes pet as given when it solves its maximiza-
tion problem since pet depends on aggregate variables. I also assume that the household faces
coordination costs when it changes the level of labor supply. The labor supply adjustment
cost, Ω(Lt, Lt−1), is given by the function
Ω(Lt, Lt−1) ≡ θl2 (
Lt − Lt−1
Γ
)2
which implies that labor supply adjustment costs do not affect the steady state.2 The period
utility function takes the form
U
(
Ct
Γ
,
Jt
Γ
)
= ln
[
Ct
Γ
]
+ Ψ ln
[
Jt
Γ
]
where Ψ is the weight of leisure. The household’s lifetime utility function can be rewritten as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct + Ψ ln
[
1− ltpet −
θl
2
(lt − lt−1)2
]}
(3.1)
where ct and lt represent the per capita consumption and the per capita labor supply respec-
tively.3
1Those household members who do not participate in the labor market preserve all their time for leisure.
2The reason of introducing the labor adjustment cost to the model is to dampen the movements in labor
supply. In a model without the labor adjustment cost, labor supply responds quickly to shocks, which is in
sharp contrast with the data.
3Since the economy comprises a single household, lt also represents the labor force participation rate in the
economy.
12
The household’s dynamic budget constraint is given by
Ptct +
Pt
Av,t
(kt − (1− δ)kt−1) + StRf,t−1D∗t−1 +
Ptθk
2
(kt − kt−1)2
= [Wt(1− τ)pet +Bt(1− pet )] lt + StD∗t +Rtkt−1 + Πt + Tt (3.2)
where kt is capital per capita, Wt is the market average nominal wage rate, Bt is nominal
unemployment benefits, D∗t is the family member’s holding of one-period nominal foreign
debts (bonds if negative), which are denominated in foreign currency. Pt is the domestic price
level and St is the nominal exchange rate. Tt is a nominal transfer from the government and
Πt is the profits received by the household from the intermediate goods firms. The capital
market is perfectly competitive. The representative household owns capital and rents it to
the intermediate goods firms, receiving a nominal rental rate of Rt. The capital is assumed
to depreciate at a constant rate δ and the household has to pay a cost when it adjusts the
amount of capital stock. The capital adjustment cost function, θk2 (kt − kt−1)2, is convex and
does not affect the steady state. Av,t is an exogenous investment-specific technology shock.
This shock affects the marginal costs in terms of consumption of producing capital.4
The household can borrow and lend freely in the foreign market at a gross nominal rate
Rf,t. This foreign rate is given by
Rf,t = R∗t ξtp(D
∗
t ) (3.3)
where R∗t is the US interest rate and ξt is an exogenous risk premium shock. p(D∗t ) is assumed
to take the form (D∗t /D∗)
ϕ, where D∗ is the steady state value of the aggregate nominal foreign
debt holdings. The parameter ϕ governs the dependence of the foreign rate on the level of
foreign debt holdings. ϕ is assumed to be positive. When foreign debt is above its steady-state
level, the interest rate on foreign debt rises. The equation implies that the foreign rate depends
on three components: the US interest rate, the risk premium shock and the debt position of
4These shocks are equivalent to the productivity shocks in a capital producing sector. See Greenwood et al.
(1998) for details.
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the household. The risk premium shock represents any external factors, other than the US
interest rate, that affect the foreign rate. The third component p(D∗t ), which is increasing in
D∗t , is required for the model to have a stationary distribution.5
Working household members earn the nominal wage rate Wt, which is taxed at rate, τ .
Household members who decide to enter the labor market, but are not employed, receive
unemployment benefits Bt. Household members who enter the labor market are employed
with probability pet and unemployed with probability 1 − pet . In that sense, unemployment
is involuntary. The household chooses ct, lt, kt and D∗t to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.2),
given lt−1, kt−1, D∗t−1, pet , Bt, all market prices, the government transfer and the firms’ profits.
Solving the household’s maximization problem yields the following first order conditions:
1
ct
= Ptλt (3.4)
Stλt = βSt+1λt+1Rf,t (3.5)
λtPt
[
1
Av,t
+ θk(kt − kt−1)
]
= Etβλt+1Pt+1
[
Rt+1
Pt+1
+
1− δ
Av,t+1
+ θk(kt+1 − kt)
]
(3.6)
and
λtW
R
t =
Ψ
jt
(pet + θl(lt − lt−1))− Et
βΨ
jt+1
θl(lt+1 − lt) (3.7)
where jt ≡ 1 − ltpet − θl2 (lt − lt−1)2 is per capita leisure, WRt ≡ Bt(1 − pet ) + Wt(1 − τ)pet
is the household member’s expected labor income and λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the
household’s budget constraint. Combining (3.4) and (3.5) gives us the standard Euler equation.
The left hand side of equation (3.6) is the marginal costs of investing one unit of capital and the
right hand side is the marginal benefits. The optimality condition indicates that the marginal
benefits of investing one unit of capital has to be equal to its marginal costs. Combining
5See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for further details.
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(3.4) and (3.7) gives us an equation showing that the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and labor supply is equal to the real expected labor income.
Equation (3.7) indicates that labor supply is positively related to the expected labor wage.
The probability of finding employment affects labor supply in two ways. On one hand, a higher
probability raises the expected labor income and causes the household to substitute labor for
leisure. On the other hand, a higher probability increases the marginal utility of leisure which
leads to a decrease in labor supply. The net effect of an increase in pet on labor supply depends
on the parameter values.
Note that the expected labor income can be written as Bt+(Wt(1−τ)−Bt)pet . The after-tax
wage rate is larger than the unemployment benefits in general, implying Wt(1−τ)−Bt > 0. An
increase in unemployment benefits would make expected labor income less responsive to the
variations in employment rate (or unemployment rate) because it narrows the compensation
gap between being employed and unemployed.
In this model, jobs are randomly assigned to the labor market participants in each period
and there are no unfilled vacancies. Hence, the probability of being unemployed is equal to
the economy’s unemployment rate: Ut = 1− pet .
3.1.2 Firms
There are three types of firms in the economy: a competitive wholesaler, a competitive
retailer and a continuum of price-setting intermediate goods firms indexed by i, where i ∈ [0, 1].
The competitive wholesale firm transforms intermediate goods into domestic wholesale goods
with a production technology given by
Yd,t =
[∫ 1
0
Xt(i)(
ε−1
ε
)di
] ε
ε−1
(3.8)
where ε is the elasticity of substitution in production, Yd,t is the domestic wholesale goods and
Xt(i) is the i th intermediate good. The wholesale goods are sold to the retailers where they
are used to produce final goods.
The wholesale firm maximizes profits
Pd,tYd,t −
∫ 1
0
Pd,t(i)Xt(i)di
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subject to (3.8). Solving the maximization problem yields the demand equation for Xt(i):
Xt(i) = Yd,t
(
Pd,t(i)
Pd,t
)−ε
(3.9)
Substituting (3.9) into (3.8) provides the relationship between the domestic price level and
intermediate goods prices.
Pd,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pd,t(i)1−ε
] 1
1−ε
Each intermediate goods firm sets the price of its own good, but all intermediate goods
firms use the same production technology given by
Xt(i) = Kt−1(i)α(An,tNt(i))1−α
where An,t is a random labor productivity shock common to all intermediate goods firms,
Kt−1(i) is the use of capital services and Nt(i) is labor employment.6
In this model, firms and unions bargain over nominal wages. Given the wage bargains,
firms are free to choose the level of employment. Hence, each firm chooses labor and capital
services to maximize its profits, taking the labor wage, the price of capital services and the
demand schedule for its particular good, (3.9), as given. Let
Πt(i) = Pd,t(Yd,t)1/ε[Kt−1(i)α(An,tNt(i))1−α](ε−1)/ε −RtKt−1(i)−Wt(i)Nt(i) (3.10)
denote the profits. Each firm solves the following maximization problem:
max
K(i),N(i)
{Πt(i)}
The resulting demand for capital services and labor are given by
Kt−1(i) = (αµ)Y
1
ε
d,tXt(i)
µ
(
Rt
Pd,t
)−1
(3.11)
and
Nt(i) = (1− α)µY
1
ε
d,tXt(i)
µ
(
Wt(i)
Pd,t
)−1
(3.12)
where µ = (ε− 1)/ε.
6The reason why imported inputs are not included in the production of intermediate goods is for tractability.
Due to the existence of heterogeneity in firms’ input demands, including imports in the intermediate goods
production function would highly complicate the aggregation process.
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Wage Bargaining
Wages are determined by a Nash bargaining process and do not clear the labor market in
general. This results in equilibrium unemployment. The unemployment mechanism is similar
to that in Peretto (2006). In the model economy, there is a continuum of decentralized unions
along the unit interval. I assume that each labor union is very small such that it cannot
influence any aggregate variables. Each intermediate goods firm bargains with only one union
over the nominal wage. Given the nominal wage, the firm determines the level of employment.
All labor market participants supply their labor to the unions before wage rates are established.
Once wages are set, jobs are randomly assigned to the union members. For those members
that are unable to get a job, they receive the unemployment benefits from the government.
Wage rigidity is introduced to the model by a Calvo-type setup. In every period, each
firm faces a constant probability, 1− ρ, of being able to renegotiate with its labor union. The
ability to renegotiate next period is independent across firms and time. The average duration
between wage bargainings is equal to 1/1 − ρ. Thus, the parameter ρ provides a measure of
the degree of wage stickiness in our model. Those firms that cannot bargain with their unions
in period t simply index the nominal wages to current inflation,
Wt(i) = Wt−1(i)
(
Pt
Pt−1
)χ
where χ ∈ [0, 1] governs the degree of wage indexation.
If a firm and its union are able to negotiate the nominal wage in period t, the union leader
and the firm’s manager determine the wage in a Nash bargaining setting. Let V FEt|t denote the
value to a firm in period t from establishing an employment relation with the union. V FEt|t is
given by
V FEt|t = Πt|t(i) + EtΛt,t+1ρV
FE
t+1|t
where Λt,t+1 ≡ βλt+1/λt is the stochastic discount factor and V FEt+1|t is the value of the firm in
period t+1 given that the wage contract last readjusted in period t remains effective.7 On the
7In this paper, variable Xt+k|t represents that the value of the variable in period t + k is affected by the
nominal wage which is last reset in period t.
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other hand, if negotiation breaks down in period t, the firm cannot produce and it makes no
profit. Thus, V FNt = 0, where V
FN
t denote the value to a firm in period t from not reaching a
wage agreement. As a result, the firm’s surplus, denoted by SFt|t, from forming an employment
relation with the union in period t is:
SFt|t = V
FE
t|t − V FNt
= Πt|t(i) + EtΛt,t+1ρSFt+1|t
Iterating the above equation forward, we obtain
SFt|t = Et
∞∑
k=0
ρkΛt,t+kΠt+k|t(i)
Next, I describe the surplus of the labor union. Let V LEt|t denote the value to a labor union
in period t when an employment relation is established. More specifically,
V LEt|t = W
∗
t (i)
(
Pt|t
Pt
)χ
(1− τ)Nt|t(i) + EtΛt,t+1ρV LEt+1|t
where W ∗t (i) denotes the optimal nominal wage bargain chosen by the firm and the union in
period t. If the union cannot bargain with the firm in period t, it receives the previous period
nominal wage indexed to current inflation. Workers are allowed to rejoin the labor market if
no wage agreement is reached in period t. In that case, they earn the expected labor income,
WRt . As a result, the value to a labor union in period t from not forming a wage agreement is
given by
V LNt|t = W
R
t Nt|t(i) + EtΛt,t+1ρV
LN
t+1|t
The surplus of a labor union in period t from forming an employment relation with the firm
is:
SLt|t = V
LE
t|t − V LNt|t
=
[
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt|t
Pt
)χ
(1− τ)−WRt
]
Nt|t(i) + EtΛt,t+1ρSLt+1|t
Again, iterating the above equation forward gives us
SLt|t = Et
∞∑
k=0
ρkΛt,t+k
[
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt+k
Pt
)χ
(1− τ)−WRt+k
]
Nt+k|t(i)
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Hence, if a firm and its union are able to negotiate the nominal wage in period t, they solve
the following problem:
max
W ∗t (i)
(1− γw) log
(
SFt|t
)
+ γw log
(
SLt|t
)
subject to the input demand equations (3.11) and (3.12). The weights 1−γw and γw represent
the power of the firm and the union in the bargaining process respectively. Both the firm
and the union take WRt as given since it depends on aggregate variables. The optimal Nash
bargained wage, W ∗t (i), chosen by the firm and the union in period t has to satisfy the following
condition
(1− γw)SLt|t
−∂SFt|t
∂W ∗t (i)
= γwSFt|t
∂SLt|t
∂W ∗t (i)
(3.13)
Equation (3.13) is the surplus sharing rule, which can be rewritten as
Et
∞∑
k=0
ρkΛt,t+k
[
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt+k
Pt
)χ
(1− τ)
]
Nt+k|t(i) =
Ξ
Ξ− 1Et
∞∑
k=0
ρkΛt,t+kWRt+kNt+k|t(i)
where Ξ ≡ γw−1γw (ε − 1)(α − 1) − α(ε − 1) + ε. Note that all firms and unions that are able
to bargain in the same period will select the same wage, which implies W ∗t (i) = W ∗t .8 Log-
linearizing the equation above give us the optimal wage setting rule:
Ŵ ∗t = (1− βρ)Et
∞∑
j=0
(βρ)j(ŴRt+j − χ(P̂t+j − P̂t))
The equation indicates that the optimal bargained wage depends on the weighted average of
the current and expected future labor income and inflations. The expected labor income is a
function of the unemployment rate, thus, expectations of the future unemployment rate can
affect current nominal wages. If the unemployment rate is expected to remain at a high level
for a long period of time, workers are willing to work for a lower wage. Note that the current
optimal wage setting rule is similar to the one obtained by Erceg et al. (2000) since WRt /Pt is
equal to the household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor supply.
8In fact, if firms and unions are able to bargain every period, i.e. ρ = 0, the bargaining process yields the
wage equation W ∗t (i) =
WRt
(1−τ) (1 + x), where x =
[
( γw−1
γw
− 1)(ε− 1)(α− 1)
]−1
is the constant wage markup.
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I now proceed with the retailer’s problem. The competitive retailer combines domestic
wholesale goods Yd,t and imported goods Ym,t to produce the final goods Yt. The final goods
production function is given by
Yt = Z
1
ν−1
t
[
(1− ω) 1ν (Yd,t)
ν−1
ν + ω
1
ν (Ym,t)
ν−1
ν
] ν
ν−1 (3.14)
where Zt is a stochastic total factor productivity shock, ω is the weight of imported inputs
and ν is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported inputs. I assume all
imported goods are used as inputs by the retailer. None are consumed directly by households.
The retailer chooses domestic wholesale goods and imported goods to maximize its profits.
The demand for the domestic goods and imports are given by
Yd,t = (1− ω)Zt
[
Pd,t
Pt
]−ν
Yt (3.15)
and
Ym,t = ωZt
[
Pm,t
Pt
]−ν
Yt (3.16)
where Pm,t = StP ∗t is the domestic currency price of imports. Combining (3.14), (3.15) and
(3.16) gives us the aggregate price level
Pt = Z
1
1−ν
t [(1− ω)(Pd,t)1−ν + ω(Pm,t)1−ν ]
1
1−ν (3.17)
3.1.3 Government Sector
I assume that the government uses the wage tax revenue to finance unemployment bene-
fits. The government distributes any residual income back to the households and its budget
constraint is:
Tt = τWtNt −Bt(Lt −Nt)
For simplicity, the unemployment benefit Bt is assumed to be proportional to the steady
state value of the average nominal wage. Specifically,
Bt = σW (3.18)
where σ measures the generosity of the government. Zanetti (2007) makes a similar assumption
for the unemployment benefits.
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3.1.4 International Sector
The rest of the world supplies imports to Hong Kong elastically at an exogenous foreign
currency price P ∗t and a domestic currency price of Pm,t. The home economy faces a standard
demand schedule for its exports: EXt = φ(Qt)ηY ∗t , which can be rewritten as
EXt
Yt
= x,t(Qt)η (3.19)
where x,t = φY ∗t /Yt is the export demand shock and η is the elasticity of export demand
with respect to the real exchange rate. φ is a scale parameter and Y ∗t is the exogenous foreign
income. The real exchange rate, Qt, is given by
Qt =
StP
∗
t
Pt
According to the definition of the real exchange rate, an increase in Qt implies that a unit
of foreign goods trades for a larger amount of Hong Kong goods. Hence, we should expect
η > 0, that is, exports are positively related to Qt.
3.1.5 Equilibrium Conditions
In this subsection, I characterize the equilibrium of the model. The average nominal wage
Wt is given by Wt =
∫ 1
0 Wt(i)
N(i)
Nt
di, where the weight attached to the wage paid by firm i is
the firm’s share of total employment.9 The nominal wage equation can be rewritten as
Wt = ρWt−1 (Pt/Pt−1)χ + (1− ρ)W ∗t (3.20)
In the labor market, equilibrium requires Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nt(i)di, which can be written in terms
of aggregate variables as
Nt = ψY d,tP
ε
d,tWN,tR
α(1−ε)
t A
(1−α)(ε−1)
n,t (3.21)
where Nt is the aggregate labor employment.10 Similarly, in the capital market, equilibrium
9Note that the average nominal wage Wt is also equal to
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)di within the local region of the steady
state. See Appendix C for the proof.
10It is important to observe that WN,t≡ ρ (Wt−1 (Pt/Pt−1)χ)α(ε−1)−ε +(1− ρ)W ∗α(ε−1)−εt ,
WK,t≡ ρ (Wt−1 (Pt/Pt−1)χ)(1−α)(1−ε) +(1− ρ)W ∗(1−α)(1−ε)t , ψ ≡ [(ε− 1)(α− 1)/ε]ε [(1− α)/α]α(1−ε) and
Θ ≡ ψ/ [(1− α)/α]. See Appendix C for derivations of the aggregate labor employment and capital demand.
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requires Kt =
∫ 1
0 Kt(i)di, which can be written as
Kt = ΘY d,tP εd,tWK,tR
α(1−ε)−1
t A
(1−α)(ε−1)
n,t (3.22)
where Kt is the aggregate capital. Investment is defined as
It = Kt − (1− δ)Kt−1 (3.23)
In the model, final output can be either consumed and invested by households or exported
to the rest of the world, so that
Yt = Ct + It/Av,t + EXt (3.24)
As mentioned, the probability of being unemployed is equal to the unemployment rate.
Thus, we have
1− pet = Ut (3.25)
Since wages are determined by the bargaining process between firms and workers, the labor
market is not clear in equilibrium. Instead, equilibrium requires
Ut =
Lt −Nt
Lt
(3.26)
The clearing condition for the foreign market is
St
[
Rf,tD
∗
t−1 −D∗t
]
= Pt[EXt −QtYm,t] (3.27)
Equation (3.27) is the current account equation and it shows that the net foreign debt holdings
measured in domestic currency is equal to the trade surplus. I also assume that the nominal
exchange rate is fixed since Hong Kong pegs its currency to the US dollar, that is St = S.
In this model, endogenous variables are ct, λt, lt, Kt, D∗t , Rf,t, Yd,t, Pd,t, Rt, Nt, Wt, W ∗t ,
Pt, Yt, Ym,t, Qt, pet , Ut, It and EXt. The system defining the equilibrium consists of equations
(3.3)-(3.8), (3.13)-(3.16), (3.19)-(3.27) and the process of the exogenous shocks.
3.1.6 The Log-linear Model
Following standard practice, I first log-linearize the model around a deterministic steady
state. I then take this log-linear model to the data. The steady state of the model is illustrated
in Appendix C. The log-linear model is:
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ĉt = −P̂t − λ̂t + ε̂c,t (L1)
l̂t = Γ2,0(ŴRt + λ̂t + Γ2,−1 l̂t−1 + Γ2,1Et l̂t+1 + Γ2,uÛt) + ε̂l,t (L2)
(1 + β)θkkk̂t − θkkk̂t−1 = λ̂t+1 + βREtR̂t+1 + β(1− δ)EtP̂t+1 − λ̂t − P̂t
+βθkkEtk̂t+1 +Av,t − β(1− δ)EtAv,t+1 (L3)
λ̂t = Etλ̂t+1 + R̂f,t (L4)
R̂f,t = R̂∗t + ξ̂t + ϕD̂∗t (L5)
Rf D̂
∗
t−1 +Rf R̂f,t−1 = D̂
∗
t + Γ6,1P̂t + Γ6,2êxt − Γ6,3(ŷm,t + Q̂t) (L6)
n̂t = ŷd,t + εP̂d,t + Γ7,1Ân,t + Γ7,2R̂t + Γ7,3[Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)] + Γ7,4Ŵ ∗t (L7)
k̂t = ŷd,t + εP̂d,t + Γ7,1Ân,t + Γ8,2R̂t + Γ8,3[Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)] + Γ8,4Ŵ ∗t (L8)
(1 + βρ2)Ŵt − βρEtŴt+1 − ρŴt−1 + βρχEtP̂t+1
−(βρ+ ρ)χP̂t + ρχP̂t−1 = (1− ρ)(1− βρ)ŴRt (L9)
Ŵt = ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) + (1− ρ)Ŵ ∗t (L10)
ŴRt = Γ11,1Ût + Γ11,2Ŵt (L11)
ŷt = (1− ω)ŷd,t + ωŷm,t + 1/(ν − 1)Ẑt (L12)
ŷm,t = −ν[Q̂t] + ŷt + Ẑt + ε̂m,t (L13)
ŷd,t = −ν[P̂d,t − P̂t] + ŷt + Ẑt (L14)
ŷd,t = αk̂t−1 + (1− α)n̂t + (1− α)Ân,t (L15)
k̂t = (1− δ)k̂t−1 + δîvt (L16)
Q̂t = P̂ ∗t − P̂t (L17)
Ût =
n
l
(l̂t − n̂t) (L18)
yŷt = cĉt + iv(îvt − Âv,t) + exêxt (L19)
êxt = ŷt + ε̂x,t + ηQ̂t (L20)
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The above model consists of 20 endogenous variables and 10 exogenous shocks.11 The
endogenous variables inculde ĉt, λ̂t, l̂t, k̂t, D̂∗t , R̂f,t, ŷd,t, P̂d,t, R̂t, n̂t, Ŵt, Ŵ ∗t , ŴRt , P̂t, ŷt, ŷm,t,
Q̂t, Ût, îvt and êxt, defined as consumption per capita, Lagrange multiplier on the household’s
budget constraint, labor participation rate, capital per capita, foreign debt holdings, foreign
interest rate, domestic inputs, nominal rental rate, employment per capita, market average
nominal wage, bargained nominal wage, expected labor income, domestic price level, output
per capita, imports per capita, real exchange rate, the unemployment rate, investment per
capita and exports per capita respectively.
The model also comprises ten exogenous shocks: Ân,t, a shock to labor productivity; Ẑt, a
shock to total factor productivity in the final goods production; Âv,t, a shock to the investment-
specific technology; ̂m,t, a shock to import demand; ̂c,t, a shock to the consumption preference;
̂l,t, a shock to the labor supply; ̂x,t, a shock to the foreign demand for Hong Kong exports;
P̂ ∗t , a shock to the foreign price level; R̂∗t , a shock to the US interest rate; and ξ̂t, a shock to
the risk premium associated with the foreign debts. Note that the hatted variables represent
the percent deviations of the variables from their respective steady state values, except for Ût,
which is defined as the arithmetic deviation of the unemployment rate from its steady state
value.
I define ς̂t = {Âv,t, Ẑt, Ân,t, ̂m,t, ̂c,t, ̂l,t, ̂x,t, P̂ ∗t , R̂∗t , ξ̂t} to be a 10 × 1 vector of structural
stochastic shocks that cause model variables to deviate from their steady state values. Each
element of ς̂t is assumed to have the following univariate representation:
ς̂i,t = ρς(L)ς̂i,t−1 + si,t
where si,t is the innovation to ς̂i,t and is assumed to be zero-mean, normally distributed and
serially uncorrelated.
I assume shocks to export demand, labor supply, foreign price level and investment-specific
technology, that is, ̂x,t, ̂l,t, P̂ ∗t and Âv,t follow an AR(1) process. The rest of the structural
11Note that Γ2,0 =
(1−U)[1−l(1−U)]
θl(1+β)[1−l(1−U)]+l(1−U)2 , Γ2,−1 =
θl
1−U , Γ2,1 =
βθl
1−U , Γ2,u =
1
(1−U)(1−l(1−U)) , Γ6,1 =
(ex−Qym)/D∗, Γ6,2 = ex/D∗, Γ6,3 = Qym/D∗, Γ7,1 = (1− α)(ε− 1), Γ7,2 = α(1− ε), Γ7,3 = ρ(α(ε− 1)− ε),
Γ7,4 = (1 − ρ)(α(ε − 1) − ε), Γ8,2 = (α(1 − ε) − 1), Γ8,3 = ρ(1 − α)(1 − ε), Γ8,4 = (1 − ρ)(1 − α)(1 − ε),
Γ11,1 =
σ−(1−τ)
σU+(1−τ)(1−U) and Γ11,2 =
(1−τ)(1−U)
σU+(1−τ)(1−U) .
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shocks are assumed to follow an AR(2) process. These specifications are made to ensure that
the structural innovations si,t are white noise.12
3.2 Estimation
In this section, I first describe the data used in the estimation. I then proceed with
discussions on the estimation methods and results. The system of log-linear equations can be
written as follows:
A
 X̂t
Et(Ŷt+1)
 = B
 X̂t−1
Ŷt
+ Cst
The solution of this system has a VAR(1) form X̂t
Ŷt
 = D
 X̂t−1
Ŷt−1
+ Fst
where X̂t includes the predetermined variables, such as k̂t, and the driving forces in the model.
Ŷt+1 are the forward-looking variables, for example, P̂t+1 and l̂t+1. The elements of st are
the structural shock innovations, si,t. Given the assumptions for si,t, we know st ∼ N(0,Σs),
E(sts′w) = 0, ∀t, w such that t 6= w. Finally, I define t to be a 10 × 1 vector which contains
the elements of the reduced form errors, Fst, associated with the observables in (X̂ ′t Ŷ ′t )′.
3.2.1 Data and Methodology
I employ ten quarterly data series in the estimation. The series include the US three
month Treasury Bill rate (R∗t ), the Hong Kong three month domestic saving deposits rate
(Rf,t), output per capita (yt), labor employment per capita (nt), imported inputs per capita
(ym,t), the unemployment rate (Ut), the real exchange rate (Qt), the nominal wage rate (Wt),
consumption per capita (ct) and investment per capita (ivt).13 The data runs from the fourth
12In an earlier estimation, I assumed all structural shocks followed a first order autoregressive process. But,
the Ljung-Box test statistics showed that the structural innovations were serially correlated. Hence, I lengthened
the autoregressions until there was no evidence of serial correlation in the innovations, with the exception of
the imports demand shock innovations.
13Note that uncovered interest rate parity holds in this model. Given that nominal exchange rate is fixed,
the foreign rate is equal to the domestic interest rate.
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quarter of 1981 to the third quarter of 2007. All series are logged, with the exception of the
US interest rate, the Hong Kong domestic rate and the unemployment rate. A constant and
the quarterly seasonal effects are extracted from each series. The series of output per capita,
nominal wage rate, consumption and investment per capita are detrended by using a linear
and a quadratic trend. The resulting series represented by R̂∗t , R̂f,t, ŷt, n̂t, ŷm,t, Ût, Q̂t, Ŵt, ĉt
and îvt are considered as the estimates of the departures of each series from its long run value.
An empirical implementation of the model requires values for three groups of parameters.
The first group of parameters includes the nominal wage tax rate, τ , the replacement ratio,
σ, the depreciation rate, δ, the household’s discount factor, β, the elasticity of export demand
with respect to the real exchange rate, η , the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
imported inputs in the final goods production function, ν and the parameter that governs the
dependence of foreign rate on the level of foreign debt holdings, ϕ. I am unable to estimate
these parameters with the data and as a result, I adopt the values from other sources. More
explicitly, I use the conventional value for β, which is equal to 0.99 and set ϕ to 0.0004, the
same value used by Cook and Deveraux (2006b). Setting ϕ to a small value ensures that the
model has a stationary equilibrium, but the assumption that interest rate responds to the debt
position of a country does not affect the responses of the model to shocks at business cycle
frequency.
I set ν = 0.5, which is equivalent to the estimate obtained by Cheng and Salemi (2010)
for Hong Kong. For the values of nominal wage tax rate and replacement ratio, I adopt the
values obtained by Salemi (2007). More specifically, the values of τ and σ are set to 0.019 and
0.365 respectively. For the elasticity of export demand parameter, I use the estimate obtained
by Abbott and DeVita (2002) for Hong Kong, which is equal to 2. The depreciation rate is
set to 0.025, which is standard in the literature.14
The second group of parameters includes the value of the weight on leisure in the utility
function, Ψ, the bargaining power of workers, γw, intermediate product demand, ε, weight on
14This value is close to one used by McNelis (2009) for the Hong Kong economy.
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capital in the production function, α, weight on imported inputs, ω, and export demand pa-
rameter, x. These parameters are calibrated to match the steady state values of six variables
with their respective sample averages. These six variables are the ratio of consumption to
output, the ratio of investment to output, the ratio of employee compensation to output, the
ratio of imported inputs to output, the ratio of real wage to consumption and the unemploy-
ment rate. Table 3.1 reports the first moments of these six variables and Table 3.2 displays
the calibrated parameter values.
Following Adolfson et al.(2007), I set the steady state value of the real exchange rate to
1. The nominal exchange rate is normalized to 1 for simplicity. The steady state values of
all exogenous variables, except for R∗t and εx,t, are also assumed to be 1 since they are not
determined in the model.
The third group of the parameters, collected in a vector ϑ, consists of parameters that
govern the dynamics of the model. They are estimated by using maximium likelihood methods.
This group includes the wage adjustment parameter, ρ, labor adjustment cost parameter, θl,
capital adjustment cost parameter, θk and a set of parameters that govern the serial correlation
properties of the structural shocks.
Since I do not impose that the structural innovations are orthogonal to each other as in
standard practice, estimating the covariances among ten strucutural shocks is a very difficult
task. To solve this problem, I adopt the approach used in Cheng and Salemi (2010) and
replace the actual variance-covariance matrix with its maximum likelihood estimate (MLE).
This approach works around our problem in the following way. The MLE of the variance-
covariance matrix is a function of the reduced form errors, which are dependent upon the
coefficient parameters. This implies that the MLE of the covariance matrix also relies on the
coefficient parameters. Therefore, we do not have to estimate the parameters in the variance-
covariance martrix separately. So, given the data sample, XT = {x1,....., xT }, the maximum
likelihood takes the form
L(ϑ) = −(Tn/2) log(2pi)− (Tn/2)− (T/2) log(| Σ̂ |)
where Σ̂ = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 t(ϑ)
′
t(ϑ), T is the number of observations, n is the number of data
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series, and t is the n × 1 vector of reduced form residuals implied by ϑ and the data. See
Appendix B for the derivation of the function.
3.2.2 Estimation Results
Table 3.3 displays the estimated values for our parameters and the standard errors for these
parameters.15 Note that most of the parameters are precisely estimated. However, the second
lag coefficients of TFP shocks and LP shocks are insignificant and close to zero. The value of
the labor supply adjustment cost parameter is equal to 970. This implies that the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to the market wage rate is close to zero since the labor adjustment
cost restrains the reponses of labor supply to the movements in the wage rate. This result is
not surprising given that labor supply is fairly stable over the sample period. The estimate for
the capital adjustment cost parameter is 0.086, which implies that the elasticity of investment
with respect to the capital shadow price (Tobin’s q) is around 9. Interestingly, this value is
much larger than the values reported in the q literature, but closer to the estimate obtained
by Groth and Kahn (2007). The authors use US microdata and obtain a value of 6 for the
investment elasticity.16
The estimate for the Calvo wage adjustment parameter is 0.92. This indiciates that nominal
wages in Hong Kong are very sticky. The probability that a firm can bargain with its workers
in each period is about 8 percent.17 This result might seem surprising considering that several
important papers, using macro data and Bayesian techniques, estimate this probability to be
30 percent for the US economy.18 This might simply mean that wages in Hong Kong are
stickier than the wages in the US. However, Del Nergo and Schorfheide (2008) point out that
15I use the ”fmincon” function in MATLAB to search for the parameter values that maximize the log-likelihood
function. The standard errors are computed based on the information matrix. Let Υ̂ denote the estimate of
the Hessian matrix that we obtain from MATLAB. The standard errors are equal to the square roots of the
diagonal elements of T−1Υ̂−1, where T is the length of the data sample.
16Also see Groth (2006).
17This signifies that the average duration between wage negotiations is about 12 quarters. Note that since
jobs are randomly assigned to the labor market participants each period, this is the frequency of wage change
for an individual regardless of his employment history.
18See Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gertler et al. (2008).
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using Bayesian estimation often delivers estimates that reflect the imposed priors. Moreover,
a recent paper by Barattieri et al. (2010) uses micro data and finds that, in the United States,
the probability of a change in nominal wage in each quarter is between 5 and 18 percent.
Our estimate is consistent with their findings. Subsequently, I consider our estimate for the
Calvo wage parameter to be reasonable. While the Calvo wage parameter tells us how quickly
nominal wages adjust to shocks, the wage indexing parameter shows the degree of real wage
stickiness in the economy. The estimate of the wage indexing parameter is 0.82, which implies
a high degree of real wage rigidity in Hong Kong.
Finally, the estimates for the parameters that govern the dynamics of the structural shocks
show that all exogenous shocks are persistent, with the exception of the labor supply shock.
The estimates for ρm1and ρm2 indicate that the largest eignvalue of the process for import
demand shock is about 0.97. Thus, a shock to import demand has a persistent effect on the
Hong Kong economy.
Table 3.4 displays our estimates of the correlations among different structural innovations.
Our estimates show that some shock innovations are highly correlated with others. For in-
stance, the US interest rate shocks and the foreign price shocks are highly correlated with each
other. Moreover, labor productivity shocks and TFP shocks are also highly correlated. This
indicates that it is very difficult to distinguish these two productivity shocks in practice. Table
3.4 also shows that labor supply shocks and risk premium shocks are not highly correlated
with other shocks.
To determine if wage rigidity is important in explaining the Hong Kong data, I estimate a
model with low wage rigidity and compare the results to the benchmark model. In this case, I
set the Calvo wage parameter, ρ, to 0.1 and apply the same method to estimate the modified
model. Table 3.5 reports the resulting estimates and the respective standard errors.
The parameter estimates are similar to those from the benchmark model, with the excep-
tion of the wage indexing parameter and the labor supply adjustment parameter. The wage
indexing parameter is lower in the model with low wage rigidity. The estimate for the labor
supply adjustment cost parameter is significantly higher than the one in the benchmark case.
This result indicates that, with low wage rigidity, the model requires labor supply to be less
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elastic in order to explain the data, though both estimates show that the wage elasticity of
labor supply is close to zero.19 The estimate of the capital adjustment cost parameter is also
larger than that from the benchmark model, signifying that investment is less sensitive to the
changes in the capital shadow price. These results reflect the fact that a model with low wage
rigdity has to rely on other frictions to account for the observed facts.
Table 3.6 reports the log-likelihood values for both models. The benchmark model is
certainly prefered to the flexible wage model as it fits the data much better.20 The difference
in log-likelihood is a significant 187 points. This suggests that the staggered wage bargaining
mechanism is empirically important for explaining the Hong Kong data. In the following
subsection, I will explore other alternatives to determine how well the benchmark model fits
the data.
3.2.3 Model Fit
I now determine how well the benchmark model fits the data. To do so, I first compare the
predicted values from the model with the actual data. I then contrast the second moments of
the model with those from the actual data.
Figure 3.1 displays the actual and predicted values of each of the ten series we employ. As
we can see, the model fits the data well since the predicted values track the actual values over
the sample period.
Table 3.7 compares the standard deviations of some key variables and the correlations from
our benchmark model with those from the data.21 The standard deviations of several key
variables in our benchmark model are close to those from the data. For instance, the standard
deviations of output, employment and unemployment from our model are 8.19, 3.63 and 2.48,
19Observe that even though the estimate of the labor adjustment cost parameter is much larger than that
from the baseline model, the implying wage elasticity of labor supply only changes from 7×10ˆ(-5) to 2×10ˆ(-5).
20I have performed a likelihood ratio test and it further confirms this result.
21The model statistics are computed as follows. Based on our parameter estimates, I generate 304 observations
and discard the first 200 in order to get rid of the initial effect. Thus, I obtain 104 observations, which is the
length of our data sample, in each simulation. Standard deviations and correlations are then computed by using
these 104 observations. This procedure is repeated 1000 times. The average of these standard deviations and
correlations are reported in Table 7.
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while the data counterparts are 7.07, 3.02 and 1.96. However, our model generates too much
volatility in investment and consumption. Perhaps incorporating investment adjustment costs,
instead of capital adjustment costs, to the model would improve the model’s ability to match
the dynamics of investment. The model also generates too little volatility in the real exchange
rate. As in many previous studies, the current model is not able to capture the dynamics of
the real exchange rate very well. In fact, Devereux and Engel (2002) argue that adding special
features such as local currency pricing to a standard open economy model can overcome this
issue. Moreover, Adolfson et al. (2007) shows that adding a set of price markup shocks to the
import and export sectors enables a model to capture the real exchange rate dynamics.
Our model appears to do a good job of capturing the second moment information in the
data. The correlations between output per capita and consumption per capita, output and
unemployment and output and employment are 0.57, -0.67 and 0.33 while those from the data
are 0.86, -0.62, and 0.31. In contrast, our model predicts that the correlations between output
per capita and nominal wage is 0.35 which far differs from the data’s value of -0.08. Overall,
these comparisons show that our theoretical model is able to explain the data reasonably well.
3.3 Impulse Response Functions
The model economy is driven by ten exogenous shocks. Here, I illustrate the dynamics
of the model by simulating the responses of some key variables to several structural shocks.
To analyze the role of wage rigidity, I compare the responses from the benchmark model with
those from a model in which wage rigidity is shut off by setting ρ = 0.
As mentioned, the structural shock innovations are correlated. To account for the cor-
relations, I assume a contemporaneous causal effect on the structural innovations by using
the Cholesky decomposition of the innovation covariance matrix. The ordering of the shock
innovations is: the US interest rate, foreign prices, export demand, total factor productivity, la-
bor productivity, investment-specific technology, risk premium, import demand, consumption
preference and labor supply. Shocks to the US interest rate are assumed to be most exoge-
nous and shocks to the labor supply are the least. When I simulate the impulse responses,
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I account for the within-period shock innovation correlations by assuming that the more ex-
ogenous innovations have a contemporaneous effect on the less exogenous shock innovations.
The assumption that foreign shocks (the US interest rate shocks, export demand shocks and
foreign price shocks) have a contemporaneous effect on domestic shocks, but not vice versa,
is standard for a small open economy. Moreover, I follow Uribe and Yue (2006) and assume
productivity shocks have a within-period effect on risk premium.
Figure 3.2 displays the responses of selected variables to a one percent positive total factor
productivity shock. The solid line and dotted line represents the responses from the benchmark
model and the model without wage rigidity respectively.22 The impulse responses represent
the percentage deviations of the variables from their deterministic steady state values, with
the exception of the responses of the unemployment rate.23 The impulse responses of the
unemployment rate represents the arithmetic deviations of the unemployment rate from its
steady state value. Note that the responses of the variables to the shock include the direct
effect of a TFP shock as well as the indirect effects of a TFP shock on other shocks that are
implied by the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix.
As the figure shows, a positive shock to the TFP raises output, investment and consump-
tion. It lowers both labor supply and employment.24 Labor supply drops after the shock due
to the income effect. The fall in labor supply is considerably larger than the fall in employ-
ment initially. This results in a decrease in unemployment. However, the negative effect of the
shock on employment is more persistent than that on labor supply. Thus, the unemployment
rate rises sharply after the first period. A TFP shock affects employment in both direct and
indirect ways. On one hand, a shock to TFP directly increases the demand for labor by raising
the marginal product of domestic inputs. On the other hand, it causes prices to drop. Given
that nominal wages are sticky, real wage will rise, resulting in a lower labor demand. Moreover,
the direct effect of a TFP shock is also offset by the observed correlation between taste shocks
22I shut off the wage rigidity by simply setting ρ = 0, while keeping the other parameter values the same.
23Note that 1 in the plots corresponds to 1%. An increase of 1 in the unemployment rate means that the
unemployment rate increases by 0.01 above its steady state level, for example, from 0.037 to 0.047.
24This result is in line with the one from Gali (2010).
32
and labor supply shocks. The indirect effect dominates the direct effect and employment falls
after the shock.
When wage rigidity is turned off, nominal wages drop to a greater extent after the shock.
A TFP shock now has less of a negative impact on employment. The reason is that real wages
now rise less after the shock, thus the negative effect of real wage on employment is milder.
The greater drop in nominal wages also leads to a deeper decrease in labor supply. As a
result, the negative impact of a TFP shock on the unemployment rate is reduced. However,
the impacts of wage rigidity on the responses of other variables are rather minimal.
Next, I look at how a shock to export demand affects the macroeconomic aggregates. Figure
3.3 illustrates the impluse response functions to a positive export demand shock. The model
predicts that a positive export demand shock raises output, consumption and investment.
An export demand shock also raises labor demand directly by increasing aggregate demand.
Labor supply rises initially then falls below the baseline after 2 quarters. The initial increase
in employment is larger than the increase in labor supply which causes unemployment to drop.
A fall in the unemployment rate then lowers labor supply by increasing the marginal utility
of leisure. The rise in real wage after the shock also lowers labor supply through the income
effect. These two mechanisms reinforce each other and cause labor supply to drop. Note that
the substitution effect is negligible because the wage elasticity of labor supply is close to zero.
A positive export demand shock has the same effect on imported inputs as a positive TFP
shock since it raises the imported inputs.
Wage rigidity changes the responses of the labor market variables significantly. In a model
without wage rigidity, employment rises modestly after the shock due to higher real wages. The
unemployment rate decreases by less and, in turn, causes labor supply to fall by a smaller per-
centage. Again, wage rigidity only has a limited effect on the responses of output, consumption
and investment.
I will now focus on the responses to a positive risk premium shock. Figure 3.4 illustrates
these responses. The risk premium shock has direct and indirect effects on investment and
consumption. A risk premium shock raises the costs of borrowing, which causes consumption
and investment to fall. On the contrary, the indirect effect of the risk premium shock through
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consumption preference shock causes investment and consumption to rise. The direct effect
dominates the indirect effect and investment and consumption both fall after the shock. This
also leads to a drop in output. Again, as in the case of total factor productivity shock, the
price level is more responsive to the risk premium shock than the nominal wage. It declines
more than the nominal wage and causes the real wage to rise.
The risk premium shock also causes employment to fall and labor supply to rise, this results
in an increase in the unemployment rate. The rise in unemployment following the shock has
a positive effect on labor supply and causes labor supply to rise further.
In the model without wage rigidity, nominal wages decrease more while real wages increase
less after the shock. This causes employment to proliferate following the shock. The impact
on the unemployment rate is also milder. Furthermore, getting rid of wage setting frictions
reduces the negative effect of a positive risk premium shock on output.
3.3.1 The Effects of the Crisis Shocks
Many papers have endeavored to explain what triggers a financial crisis. However, as
previously mentioned, investigating the causes of a financial crisis is not the aim of this paper.
This particular paper is related to the strain of literature which models a financial crisis as
exogenous shocks to the economy and investigates the impact of a crisis. Some of the influential
works along this line of literature include papers by the following authors. Cook and Deveraux
(2006a, 2006b) and Kehoe and Rhul (2009) model a finanical crisis as an exogenous increase in
the risk premium. While, Meza and Quintin (2007) model the Mexican crisis as shocks to the
foreign interest rate, TFP and several distortionary taxes. Otsu (2008) model the Korean crisis
as shocks to the real interest rate and TFP. Whereas, Mendoza and Smith (2006) argue that a
financial crisis is triggered by a binding borrowing constraint following a negative technology
shock.
In this paper, I attempt to identify the impact of different structural shocks on Hong Kong
output and the unemployment rate during the Asian crisis.25 Given the estimated parameter
25As mentioned earlier, I refer to crisis shocks as all the structural shocks experienced by Hong Kong after
the second quarter of 1997.
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values in the benchmark model, I can back out the estimates for all strucutral shock innovations
over the sample period. I then follow Cook and Devereux (2006a) and consider that the Asian
financial crisis started in the third quarter of 1997. Thus, the ramifications of each of the
structural shocks can be evaluated by feeding the shock series estimates, experienced by Hong
Kong after the second quarter of 1997, to the model.26
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 display the effect of each shock series on Hong Kong output as
well as the observed movements from the data. The detrended value of output in the second
quarter of 1997 is normalized to zero to facilitate the comparsion. Detrended output decreased
by about 19 percent from the third quarter of 1997 to the first quarter of 1999. The sticky
wage model predicts that, among all crisis shocks, export demand shocks have the greatest
impact on output. They cause Hong Kong output to fall by around 7 percent. Import demand
shocks also have non-trivial effects on the economy. This finding is in line with Berman (2006).
The author shows that financial crises often affect economies by reducing import demand and
export demand. Shocks to TFP have a tremendous negative impact on output during crisis
periods. This result is consistent with the findings by Meza and Quintin (2007). However,
shocks to the risk premium and foreign prices have a rather negligible effect.
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 illustrate the impact of different structural shocks on the unem-
ployment rate. The demeaned value of the unemployment rate in the second quarter of 1997 is
normalized to zero. Although shocks to TFP cause output to drop significantly, they are not
responsible for the sharp increase in the unemployment rate. The rise in the unemployment
rate during the crisis years are largely caused by the export demand shocks. Moreover, shocks
to labor productivity and import demand have a significant impact on unemployment after
1997. Labor supply shocks also play a crucial role in explaining the increase in unemploy-
ment. Finally, our results show that shocks to risk premium have only a small impact on the
unemployment rate in Hong Kong during the Asian crisis.
26Note that the initial values of the model variables in the simulations are the values in the second quarter
of 1997.
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3.3.2 Counterfactual Experiments
The Role of Nominal Wage Rigidity
I now return to the question of interest. Can the large impact of the Asian crisis on
Hong Kong output and unemployment be attributed to the slow wage adjustment process?
Given that we have a structural model, we can address this question by conducting some
counterfactual experiments.
First, I shut off the wage rigidity mechanism in the sticky wage model by setting ρ = 0
and keep all other estimated parameter values and shock estimates the same. We now have a
model with period-by-period wage negotiations. I then feed our shock estimates, experienced
by Hong Kong during the crisis years, to the modified model to generate a counterfactual path
for Hong Kong output. As a result, I can simulate the impact of the Asian crisis as if wage
rigidity is absent in Hong Kong. I compare this counterfacutal path with the observed path
from the data. The difference between these two paths represents the contributions of wage
stickiness to the output dynamics during the crisis.27 A similar procedure is also applied to
determine the role of wage rigidity in explaining the movements in the unemployment rate.
The analysis yields an interesting finding: wage rigidity is responsible for the significant
increase in the unemployment rate during the crisis, but not for the severe fall in output.
Figure 3.9 shows that the crisis shocks cause Hong Kong output to plummet by about 17.5
percent when the wage rigidity is shut off, 1.5 percent less than the fall obtained from the
data. Thus, wage frictions only account for a tiny fraction of the impact of the crisis on
output. Nonetheless, wage frictions play a more predominate role in explaining the effect of
the crisis on the unemployment rate. Figure 3.10 depicts the effect of the crisis shocks on the
unemployment rate from both the data and the model without wage setting frictions. The
figure shows that wage rigidity in Hong Kong is responsible for more than half of the increase
in the unemployment rate during the crisis.
To understand this result, we have to apprehend how prices are affected by wages. In our
27Iacoviello and Neri (2010) adopt a similar procedure to quantify the contributions of collateral constraints
to the consumption dynamics in the US.
36
model, the optimal price setting condition for the intermediate goods firms is given by
P̂d,t = αR̂t + (1− α)Ŵt − (1− α)Ân,t
Combining the above equation with the log-linearized form of equation (3.17) yields the
price equation
P̂t = (1− ω)[αR̂t + (1− α)Ŵt − (1− α)Ân,t] + ωP̂m,t + 1/(1− ν)Ẑt
According to our calibration exercise, the product (1 − ω)(1 − α) is equal to 0.37. It implies
that labor compensations constitute only a small fraction of the production costs of final
goods. Firms place a small weight on wage costs when they set prices. In fact, this estimate
is consistent with the fact that productions in Hong Kong had become less labor-intensive
after 1980.28 The value is also close to the ones assumed by Cook and Devereux (2006b) and
Shi and Xu (2008) for the labor share in the production of trade goods in Asian economies.
Also, Genberg and Pauwels (2005) stress that prices in Hong Kong respond more to changes
in imported input costs than labor costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that wage rigidity has
only a moderate effect on output dynamics.
To prove the claim that low labor share is responsible for the small effect of wage rigidity on
output, I investigate how wage rigidity alters the impact of a structural shock at various levels
of labor share. In Table 3.8, I report the percentage of the initial impact of an export demand
shock on output and the unemployment rate that is explained by wage rigidity at different
labor share values.29 As the labor share increases, the effect of wage rigidity on output and
the unemployment rate becomes greater.30 In fact, when labor share is equal to 0.7, about 95
28Prior to the 1980s, Hong Kong mainly specialized in producing labor-intensive manufactured goods such as
clothing and textiles. In 1980, China underwent an economic reform and allowed foreign investors to enter its
market. Since then, most of the labor-intensive industries have been relocated from Hong Kong to mainland
China where labor costs are low, and only the capital-intensive industries are left in Hong Kong. See Hsieh and
Woo (2005).
29I look at the impact of an export demand shock because our result shows that shocks to export demand are
the main cause of the decline in Hong Kong output and the increase in unemployment during the Asian crisis.
30The percentages reported in Table 8 are computed as follows. The initial impacts of a one percent negative
export demand shock on output and the unemployment rate in a sticky wage model (ρ = 0.92) and in a model
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percent of the initial impact of an export demand shock on output can be explained by the
wage setting frictions.
The Role of Unemployment Benefits
In this subsection, I explore the role of unemployment benefits in explaining the behaviors
of output and unemployment during the Asian crisis. As mentioned, a higher replacement
ratio narrows the compensation gap between being employed and unemployed. Hence, higher
unemployment benefits makes the expected labor income become less responsive to the changes
in the unemployment rate. Since the bargained wage between firms and unions is set according
to the expected labor income, unemployment benefits can alter the responses of output and
employment to shocks by influencing the wage flexibility.
I adopt the same approach used in the previous subsection and attempt to quantify the
effects of unemployment benefits during the crisis. I change the value of the replacement ratio,
σ, to zero and feed the shock estimates to the modified model. The responses of output and
the unemployment rate obtained in the counterfactual experiments are simliar to the data.
Interestingly, the unemployment rate rises more in our counterfactual experiment, though the
increase is rather minimal. The analysis shows that unemployment benefits are not responsible
for the deep consequences of the Asian crisis. Since the effects of unemployment benefits are
not significant, I do not display the results here.
Counterfactual Exchange Rate Regime
In the last part of this chapter, I investigate the role of the fixed exchange rate regime in
shaping the impact of the crisis. There has been an unsettled debate concerning the exchange
rate policy in Hong Kong. On one hand, many authors argue that by allowing the exchange
rate to depreciate, the effect of the Asian crisis can be mitigated through the promotion of
exports. On the other hand, giving up the currency board arrangement can trigger large
without wage rigidity (ρ = 0) are recorded. The entrants in the table are equal to the difference between these
two recorded values divided by the one from the sticky wage model. This procedure is then repeated at various
labor share values.
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currency devaluations during a crisis, which can cause severe contractions when much of the
country’s debts are denominated in foreign currency.
We must ask, therefore, what if Hong Kong had abandoned its currency board arrangement
during the crisis. To address this question, I carry out a similar counterfactual exercise on the
estimated sticky wage model as in the previous two subsections. Assuming that the central
bank of Hong Kong gives up its fixed exchange rate policy and follows an inflation-targeting
regime during the crisis, I further postulate that the central bank adopts a simple form of the
Taylor rule for the domestic interest rate given by
R̂d,t = φrR̂d,t−1 + (1− φr)φpipit
where R̂d,t and pit are the domestic interest rate and inflation respectively. I set the interest
rate smoothing parameter, φr, to 0.7 and inflation parameter, φpi, to 1.9. These values are
close to those obtained by Gertler et al. (2008) for the US economy. In oder to conduct our
counterfactual experiment, we have to modify our log-linear model since the nominal exchange
rate is now allowed to float. In particular, we need to rewrite (L4), (L6) and (L17) as
λ̂t + Ŝt = EtŜt+1 + λ̂t+1 + R̂f,t
Q̂t = Ŝt + P̂ ∗t − P̂t
and
(Rf − 1)Ŝt +Rf D̂∗t−1 +Rf R̂f,t−1 = D̂∗t + Γ6,1P̂t + Γ6,2êxt − Γ6,3(ŷm,t + Q̂t)
respectively. Furthermore, the uncovered interest rate parity condition now becomes
R̂d,t = EtŜt+1 − Ŝt + R̂f,t
Hence, the short-run model now consists of 22 endogenous variables, with R̂d,t and Ŝt as
the two new variables, and 10 exogenous shocks. Keeping all parameter estimates and shock
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innovation estimates the same, I feed our crisis shock estimates to the modified model and
construct the counterfactual paths for output and the unemployment rate.
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 display the results for output and the unemployment rate
respectively. According to our counterfactural experiments, allowing exchange rate to float
during the Asian crisis would alleviate the impact of the crisis on the Hong Kong economy. In
particular, the unemployment rate would rise by less under the inflation targeting regime. The
positive effects on output and unemployment through export growth seem to outweight the
negative effects of currency devaluations. In fact, this result is in line with the one obtained
by Cook and Devereux (2006b).
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Table 3.1: Steady State Moments
Description Variable Value
Unemployment rate UR 0.037
Employment n 0.591
Ratio of wage bill to output nw/y 0.292
Ratio of consumption to output c/y 0.498
Ratio of investment to output iv/y 0.181
Ratio of imports to output ym/y 0.306
Table 3.2: Calibrated Parameter Values (Union Model)
Description Parameter Value
Export demand location parameter x 0.320
Weight on leisure in the utility function Ψ 0.335
Weight on capital in the production function α 0.465
Weight on imports in the production function ω 0.306
Relative bargaining power of workers γw 0.048
Intermediate product demand parameter ε 4.722
Figure 3.1: Comparison of Actual Values and Model Predictions
Note: The solid lines represent the actual values and the dashed lines represent the model
predictions.
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Table 3.3: Estimated Parameter Values (Union Model)
Description Variable Value S.E.
Labor Supply Adj. Cost Parameter θl 970.1 118.8
Capital Adj. Cost Parameter θk 0.086 0.029
Calvo Wage Parameter ρ 0.920 0.015
Wage Indexing Parameter χ 0.821 0.078
US Interest Rate Shock
1st Lag ρus1 1.215 0.047
2nd Lag ρus2 -0.332 0.046
Total Factor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρz1 0.921 0.024
2nd Lag ρz2 0.042 0.023
Labor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρa1 0.928 0.025
2nd Lag ρa2 0.034 0.024
Risk Premium Shock
1st Lag ρξ1 0.649 0.094
2nd Lag ρξ2 0.272 0.089
Taste Shock
1st Lag ρς1 0.805 0.042
2nd Lag ρς2 0.117 0.032
Import Demand Shock
1st Lag ρm1 0.907 0.025
2nd Lag ρm2 0.065 0.023
Export Demand Shock ρx1 0.979 0.007
Foreign Price Shock ρfp 0.961 0.016
Investment-Specific Tech Shock ρv 0.940 0.021
Labor Supply Shock ρl -0.148 0.047
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Table 3.4: Estimated Pair-wise Correlations Among Structural Innovations from the Union
Model
RUS FP EX TFP LP IV RP M C L
RUS 1 0.61 -0.35 -0.24 -0.13 0.58 0.14 -0.17 0.45 0.31
FP 1 -0.44 -0.28 -0.11 0.69 0.21 -0.55 0.61 0.13
EX 1 0.77 0.70 -0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.41 0.03
TFP 1 0.97 0.13 -0.11 0.04 -0.10 -0.17
LP 1 0.26 -0.12 -0.20 -0.02 -0.18
IV 1 0.42 -0.35 0.62 0.24
RP 1 0.14 0.55 0.18
M 1 -0.21 0.23
C 1 0.06
L 1
Note: These are structural innovations to RUS, the US interest rate; FP, the foreign price index; EX,
export demand; TFP, total factor productivity; LP, labor productivity; IV, investment technology; RP,
the risk premium; M, import demand; C, consumption preference; and L, labor supply.
Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions to a One Percent Shock to Total Factor Productivity
from the Union Model
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Table 3.5: Estimated Parameter Values, ρ = 0.1
Description Variable Value S.E.
Labor Supply Adj. Cost Parameter θl 3491 8.743
Capital Adj. Cost Parameter θk 0.200 0.013
Wage Indexing Parameter χ 0.335 0.147
US Interest Rate Shock
1st Lag ρus1 1.262 0.049
2nd Lag ρus2 -0.393 0.161
Total Factor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρz1 0.977 0.023
2nd Lag ρz2 -0.173 0.024
Labor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρa1 0.960 0.029
2nd Lag ρa2 -0.125 0.060
Risk Premium Shock
1st Lag ρξ1 0.577 0.252
2nd Lag ρξ2 0.166 0.030
Taste Shock
1st Lag ρς1 0.761 0.023
2nd Lag ρς2 0.149 0.078
Import Demand Shock
1st Lag ρm1 0.939 0.051
2nd Lag ρm2 -0.099 0.168
Export Demand Shock ρx 0.999 0.002
Foreign Price Shock ρfp 0.919 0.048
Investment-Specific Tech Shock ρv 0.848 0.020
Labor Supply Shock ρl -0.281 0.093
Table 3.6: Log-Likelihood (Union Bargaining Model)
Benchmark Flexible Wage
3153 2966
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Table 3.7: Business Cycle Properties of the Union Model
Model Data
Standard Deviation (percent)
Output (y) 8.19 7.07
Investment (iv) 15.42 9.92
Consumption (c) 8.96 5.38
Employment (n) 3.63 3.02
Unemployment (U) 2.48 1.96
Imports (m) 22.17 21.80
Wage Rate (W) 11.82 7.91
US Interest Rate (R*) 0.48 0.63
Foreign Rate (Rf ) 0.70 0.74
Real Exchange Rate (Q) 9.05 16.10
Correlations
c, y 0.57 0.86
iv, y 0.70 0.43
U, y -0.67 -0.62
n, y 0.33 0.31
W, n -0.03 -0.24
W, U -0.40 0.10
c, iv 0.47 0.52
U, n -0.50 -0.82
Table 3.8: Impact of an Export Demand Shock Explained by Wage Rigidity
Labor Share (1− ω)(1− α) 40 50 60 70
Output 4.5 49 72 95
The Unemployment Rate 89.9 99 99.6 99.7
Note: The values are in percentage points
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Functions to a One Percent Shock to Export Demand from the
Union Model
Figure 3.4: Impulse Response Functions to One Percent Shock to Risk Premium from the
Union Model
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Figure 3.5: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on Output after 1997 (A)
Figure 3.6: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on Output after 1997 (B)
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Figure 3.7: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on the Unemployment Rate after 1997
(A)
Figure 3.8: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on the Unemployment Rate after 1997
(B)
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Figure 3.9: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on Output from the Union Model
Figure 3.10: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on the Unemployment Rate from the Union Model
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Figure 3.11: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on Output under a Different Policy Regime (from the
Union Model)
Figure 3.12: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on Unemployment under a Different Policy Regime
(from the Union Model)
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Chapter 4
Search and Matching Model
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I investigated the effects of wage rigidity on the Hong Kong
economy during the Asian financial crisis, using a small open economy model that incorporated
a staggered wage bargaining mechanism. Unemployment appears in the model simply because
the bargained wage is set above the market-clearing level. However, unemployment might be
the result of a slow and costly job matching process. It often takes time and resources for a firm
to find suitable job candidates. Thus, the costs of hiring depend not only on wages, but also the
search costs. This implies that frictions in the job searching process could alter the responses
of wages and employment to shocks and, consequently, affect the output and unemployment
dynamics in an economy. While search frictions could have important implications for the
behavior of the labor market, the union bargaining model in the previous chapter does not
capture these frictions. Therefore, it is absolutely essential for us to investigate whether a
standard Mortensen-Pissarides type search model would better explain the Hong Kong data.
In this chapter, I develop and estimate a small open economy model with search and
matching frictions for Hong Kong. This model possesses a rich labor market structure. In
particular, it can capture the movements in job vacancies as well as unemployment. In the
following section, I characterize the search-matching model and the estimation methods. Then,
I compare the estimated results between the union bargaining model and the search-matching
model. To facilitate comparison, the structures of the bond market, the capital market and
the international sector are kept the same. Thus, the main difference between the two models
lies in the structure of the labor market. Moreover, the business cycle dynamics of the search-
matching model are assumed to be driven by the same exogenous shocks that appear in the
union bargaining model. I also use the same data series to estimate the model parameters.
I find that the union bargaining model seems to fit the observed data better than the
baseline search model. More specifically, the volatilities of wages and consumption generated
by the search model are much higher than those in the data. The implied correlations between
employment and output is considerably weaker than its data counterpart.
In the last part of this chapter, I introduce wage rigidity to the baseline search model in
order to further determine the importance of wage rigidity in explaining the Hong Kong data.
I find that adding wage rigidity to the baseline search model improves the model fit of the data.
The volatilities of wages and consumption are more subdued in the modified search model.
Moreover, the estimate for the Calvo wage parameter from the modified search-matching model
is very close to the one we obtained from the union bargaining model. Specifically, I obtain
an estimate of 0.91 for the Calvo parameter from the search model, while the same parameter
estimate from the union bargaining model is equal to 0.92.
Finally, by conducting counterfactual experiments on the modified search model, I find that
wage rigidity in Hong Kong accounts for a 1.5 percentage points increase in the unemployment
rate and a 2 percentage points drop in output during the crisis period. This result is consistent
with that from the union bargaining model and it further proves that wage rigidity is a vital
mechanism which is needed to explain the sharp rise in the Hong Kong unemployment during
the Asian crisis.
4.2 The Model
The standard Mortensen-Pissarides search model will be described in detail in this section.
It is important to note that, in this model, the nominal wage is determined by a Nash bar-
gaining process between a firm and an individual worker, instead of a labor union. Moreover,
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I follow the standard practice in the literature and assume that existing employment relation-
ships end at an exogenous rate in each period. Firms can attract new workers by posting
vacancies, however, they have to pay a cost to create these new vacancies. In addition, each
vacancy can only be filled with a certain probability. Hiring (matching) is a function of the
number of vacancies and the number of unemployed workers that are searching for jobs in
period t. Since hiring is a time-consuming process, unemployment could persist after a shock.
4.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical and infinitely-lived households in this economy. The
preference of the representative household is described by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct, lt)
where ct is consumption and lt represents the total time used by the household for labor market
activities and is defined as
lt = nt + ψut
where nt and ut are the fractions of household members that are employed and unemployed
respectively. I assume each household member is endowed with one unit of time. If the
household member is participating in the labor market and currently employed, she uses all
her time working. On the other hand, if she is unemployed, she can recover a fraction, 1− ψ,
of her time for leisure activities. Following Gali (2010), I assume the period utility function
takes the form
U (ct, lt) = ln ct − κ1 + ϑl
1+ϑ
t (4.1)
The household’s budget constraint is given by
ct +
1
Av,t
(kt − (1− δk)kt−1) + StRf,t−1
D∗t−1
Pt
+
θk
2
(kt − kt−1)2
=
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
Pt
nt(i)dj + St
D∗t
Pt
+ rk,tkt−1 + pit (4.2)
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where kt is capital per capita, Wt(i) is the nominal wage rate received by the household
members who are working at firm i and D∗t is the family member’s holding of one-period
nominal foreign debts (bonds if negative), which are denominated in foreign currency. Pt is
the domestic price level and St is the nominal exchange rate. pit is the profits received by the
household from the intermediate-good firms. The capital market is perfectly competitive. The
representative household owns capital and rents it to the wholesale firms for a real return of
rk,t. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δk and the household needs to pay an adjustment
cost when the stock of capital changes. The capital adjustment cost function is assumed to
be convex and is given by θk2 (kt − kt−1)2. Av,t is an exogenous investment-specific technology
shock. This shock affects the marginal costs, in terms of consumption goods, of producing
capital.
As in the union bargaining model, the household can borrow and lend freely in the foreign
market at a gross nominal rate Rf,t. To ensure that the current small open economy model
has a stationary distribution, the foreign rate is assumed to be
Rf,t = R∗t ξf,tp(D
∗
t )
where R∗t is the US interest rate and ξf,t is an exogenous risk premium shock.1 p(D∗t ) is
assumed to take the form (D∗t /D∗)
ϕ, where D∗ is the steady state value of the aggregate
nominal foreign debt holdings. The parameter ϕ governs the dependence of the foreign rate
on the level of foreign debt holdings.
The household chooses ct, kt and D∗t to maximize (4.1) subject to (4.2), given lt, kt−1,
D∗t−1, all market prices and the firms’ profits. Solving the household’s maximization problem
yields the following first order conditions:
1
ct
= λt (4.3)
Stλt = βSt+1λt+1Rf,t (4.4)
1See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for further details.
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and
λt
[
1
Av,t
+ θk(kt − kt−1)
]
= Etβλt+1
[
rk,t +
1− δk
Av,t+1
+ θk(kt+1 − kt)
]
(4.5)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. Again, combining
(4.3) and (4.4) gives us the standard Euler equation. Equation (4.5) shows that the marginal
costs of investing one unit of capital is equal to the marginal benefits in equilibrium.
4.2.2 Firms
The economy consists of three types of firms: a wholesaler, a retailer and a continuum of
intermediate-good firms indexed by i, where i ∈ [0, 1]. I assume that all firms are operated in
a perfect competitive environment. Each intermediate-good firm uses a common production
technology to produce intermediate goods Yx,t(i). The production function takes the form
Yx,t(i) = (An,tNt(i))1−α
where An,t is a random labor productivity shock and Nt(i) is labor employment.2 As men-
tioned, each intermediate-good firm bargains with an individual worker over the nominal wage.
Given the wage bargains, firms can determine the level of employment. To attract new work-
ers, each firm is allowed to post vacancies at a cost. The number of new hires (matches) is
determined by the following matching function
Mt = V σt (U
o
t )
1−σ
where Vt is the number of vacancies posted and Uot is the number of the household members
that are unemployed and searching for jobs at the beginning of period t. The probability of
filling a vacancy is given by
qt =
Mt
Vt
and the probability for a job seeker to find a job is
xt =
Mt
Uot
2Since I will introduce wage stickiness to the model later in this chapter, I use a production function
characterized by diminishing returns to scale. This will ensure that the equilibrium is consistent with the price
taking assumption when wage dispersions exist.
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A constant fraction of existing jobs is assumed to be terminated in each period. Thus, em-
ployment in firm i follows the law of motion
Nt(i) = (1− δ)Nt−1(i) + qtVt(i)
where δ is the exogenous job separation rate. The firm’s value can be written as
Jt(i) =
Px,t
Pt
Yx,t(i)− Wt(i)
Pt
N(i)t − ΓVt(i) + EtΛt,t+1Jt+1(i)
where Λt,t+1 ≡ βλt+1/λt is the stochastic discount factor and Γ denotes the fixed cost for
posting a vacancy. Each firm maximizes its value by choosing vacancies Vt(i), given all market
prices, the probability of filling a vacancy, qt, and its existing employment stock, Nt−1(i). The
maximization problem leads to the following first order condition:
MRPNt(i) =
Wt(i)
Pt
+Gt − (1− δ)EtΛt,t+1Gt+1 (4.6)
where MRPNt(i) = Px,t/Pt(1− α)A1−αn,t Nt(i)−α is the marginal revenue product of labor and
Gt ≡ Γ/qt denotes the costs per hire. The right hand side of the equation represents the
marginal cost of hiring a worker today. The marginal cost consists of three components: the
real wage, the hiring costs in this period and the hiring costs that would be saved in the next
period. Unlike the union bargaining model, firms’ hiring decision is affected by both the search
costs and wages.
Nash Bargaining
In this model, each firm bargains with the new hire over his or her nominal wage. Both the
firm and new worker are expected to agree on the equilibrium wage in any future period when
they maintain the employment relationship. The value to the household member in period t
from forming an agreement with firm i is given by
V Nt (i) =
W ∗t (i)
Pt
−MRSt + Et
{
Λt,t+1
[
(1− δ)V Nt+1(i) + δV Ut+1
]}
where W ∗t (i) denotes the optimal nominal wage bargain chosen by the firm and an employee
in period t and MRSt is the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption. I
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assume that workers can search for another job within the same period if negotiation breaks
down. Thus, the value to the household member from being unemployed is given by
V Ut = xt
∫ 1
0
(
Mt(z)
Mt
)
V Nt (z)dz + (1− xt)
(−ψMRSt + EtΛt,t+1V Ut+1)
Following Gali (2010), the value to the household member from not participating in the
labor market is assumed to be zero. In an equilibrium with positive non-participations, the
value to a household member from entering the labor market must be equivalent to that from
not participating. It implies that V Ut = 0, ∀t. As a result, the surplus to the worker in period
t from forming an employment relationship with a firm is:
SHt (i) = V
N
t (i)− V Ut
=
W ∗t (i)
Pt
−MRSt + (1− δ)Et(Λt,t+1SHt+1(i))
Moreover, setting V Ut to zero gives us the optimal participation condition
ψMRSt =
xt
1− xt
∫ 1
0
(
Mt(z)
Mt
)
SHt (z)dz
On the other hand, the value to a firm from establishing an employment relationship with a
worker is given by
V Ft (i) = MRPNt −
W ∗t (i)
Pt
+ (1− δ)Et(Λt,t+1V Ft+1(i))
If negotiation breaks down in period t, the firm receives zero value. Thus, V Nt = 0, where V
N
t
denotes the value to a firm in period t from not reaching a wage agreement. As a result, the
firm’s surplus, denoted by SFt (i), is:
SFt (i) = V
F
t (i)− V Nt
= MRPNt − W
∗
t (i)
Pt
+ (1− δ)EtΛt,t+1SFt+1(i)
Combining the equation above with equation (4.6) gives us that SFt (i) = Gt. In equilibrium,
the surplus that a firm obtains from forming a employment relationship is equal to the hiring
costs, or equivalently, the costs needed to replace an employed worker.
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As mentioned, nominal wage is assumed to be determined by a Nash bargaining process.
More specifically, each firm-worker pair solves the following problem:
max
W ∗t (i)
ξ log
(
SFt (i)
)
+ (1− ξ) log (SNt (i))
The weights ξ and (1−ξ) represent the bargaining power of the firm and the worker respectively.
The optimal Nash bargained wage, W ∗t (i), chosen by the firm and the worker has to satisfy
the surplus sharing rule
ξSHt (i) = (1− ξ)SFt (i)
The optimal wage bargain can be rewritten as
W ∗t (i)
Pt
= ξMRSt + (1− ξ)MRPNt
Note that the optimal wage bargain is the same across all firms, which implies W ∗t (i) = W ∗t .
Now, let us turn to the wholesaler problem. The wholesale firm uses capital services
Kt−1 and intermediate goods Yx,t to produce domestic wholesale goods, Yd,t. The production
function takes the form
Yd,t = Kθt−1Y
1−θ
x,t
Maximizing the firm’s profits yields the following optimality conditions:
θYd,t
Kt−1
=
Rk,t
Pd,t
and
(1− θ)Yd,t
Yx,t
=
Px,t
Pd,t
Finally, the competitive retailer combines domestic wholesale goods Yd,t and imported
goods Ym,t to produce final goods Yt. The final-good production function is given by
Yt = Z
1
ν−1
t
[
(1− ω) 1ν (Yd,t)
ν−1
ν + ω
1
ν (Ym,t)
ν−1
ν
] ν
ν−1
where Zt is a stochastic total factor productivity shock, ω is the weight of imported inputs
and ν is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported inputs. I assume all
imported goods are used as inputs by the retailer. None are consumed directly by households.
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The retailer chooses domestic wholesale goods and imported goods to maximize its profits.
The demand for the domestic goods and imports are given by
Yd,t = (1− ω)Zt
[
Pd,t
Pt
]−ν
Yt
and
Ym,t = ωZt
[
Pm,t
Pt
]−ν
Yt
where Pm,t = StP ∗t is the price of imports in terms of domestic currency. The international
sector in this model is identical to the one in the wage bargaining model and, therefore, it is
not described here.
4.2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium conditions are described in this subsection. The aggregate nominal wage
equation is
Wt = W ∗t
Investment is defined as
It = Kt − (1− δk)Kt−1
In equilibrium, the unemployment rate is defined as
URt =
Ft −Nt
Ft
Note that the after-hiring unemployment is given by
Ut = (1− xt)Uot
and the labor force participation rate in the economy is defined as
Ft = Nt + Ut
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + It/Av,t + EXt +GtMt
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The foreign market clearing condition is
St
[
Rf,tD
∗
t−1 −D∗t
]
= Pt[EXt −QtYm,t]
Finally, the nominal exchange rate in Hong Kong is assumed to be fixed, thus we have
St+1 = St = S
4.2.4 The Log-linear Model
The log-linearized version of the search-and-matching model is presented here. The steady
state of the model is illustrated in Appendix D. The log-linear model is given by
ĉt = −λ̂t + ε̂c,t (E1)
(1 + β)θkkk̂t − θkkk̂t−1 = Et+1λ̂t+1 + βrkEtr̂kt+1 − λ̂t
+βθkkEtk̂t+1 +Av,t − β(1− δ)EtAv,t+1 (E2)
λ̂t − P̂t = Et(λ̂t+1 − P̂t+1) + R̂f,t (E3)
l̂t = Γ4,1n̂t + Γ4,2ût (E4)
R̂f,t = R̂∗t + ϕD̂∗t + ̂t (E5)
Rf D̂
∗
t−1 +Rf R̂f,t−1 = D̂
∗
t + Γ6,1P̂t + Γ6,2êxt − Γ6,3(ŷm,t + Q̂t) (E6)
Ĝt = γx̂t (E7)
x̂t = m̂t − ûot (E8)
n̂t = (1− δ)n̂t−1 + δm̂t (E9)
f̂t = Γ10,1n̂t + Γ10,2ûot − Γ10,3Ĝt + ε̂l,t (E10)
ût = ûot −
x
1− xx̂t (E11)
ûrt = f̂t − n̂t (E12)
m̂rst =
1
1− xx̂t + Ĝt (E13)
m̂rpnt = P̂d,t − P̂t + (1− α)Ân,t − αn̂t (E14)
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m̂rpnt = Γ15,1(Ŵt − P̂t) + Γ15,2Ĝt − Γ15,3Et(λ̂t+1 − λ̂t + Ĝt+1) (E15)
m̂rst = ĉt + ϑl̂t (E16)
Ω̂t = Γ17,1m̂rst + Γ17,2m̂rpnt (E17)
piwt − P̂t = Ω̂t (E18)
piwt = Ŵt − Ŵt−1 (E19)
piPt = P̂t − P̂t−1 (E20)
ŷd,t = θk̂t−1 + (1− θ)ŷx,t (E21)
r̂k,t + P̂t = P̂d,t + ŷd,t − k̂t−1 (E22)
P̂x,t = P̂d,t + ŷd,t − ŷx,t (E23)
ŷt = (1− ω)ŷd,t + ωŷm,t + 1/(ν − 1)Ẑt (E24)
ŷm,t = −ν[Q̂t] + ŷt + Ẑt + ε̂m,t (E25)
ŷd,t = −ν[P̂d,t − P̂t] + ŷt + Ẑt (E26)
ŷx,t = (1− α)(n̂t + Ân,t) (E27)
k̂t = (1− δ)k̂t−1 + δîvt (E28)
Q̂t = P̂ ∗t − P̂t (E29)
Y ŷt = Cĉt + I(îvt − Âv,t) + EXêxt +GM(Ĝt + m̂t) (E30)
êxt = ŷt + ηQ̂t + ε̂x,t (E31)
The model above consists of 31 endogenous variables and 10 exogenous shocks.3 The
endogenous variables include ĉt, λ̂t, l̂t, k̂t, D̂∗t , R̂f,t, ŷd,t, P̂d,t, r̂k,t, n̂t, Ŵt, P̂t, ŷt, ŷm,t, Q̂t, ût,
îvt, êxt, P̂x,t, Ĝt, m̂t, ŷx,t, piwt , pi
P
t , Ω̂t, m̂rst, m̂rpnt, x̂t, û
o
t , f̂t and ûrt defined as consumption
per capita, Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint, labor participation rate,
3Note that Γ6,1 = (EX − QYm)/D∗, Γ6,2 = EX/D∗, Γ6,3 = QYm/D∗, Γ4,1 = NL , Γ4,2 = ψUL , Γ10,1 = NF ,
Γ10,2 =
U
F
, Γ10,3 =
U
F
x
(1−x)γ , Υ =
ξMRS
W/P
, Φ = B
W/P
+B, B = (1− (1− δ)β)G, Γ15,1 = WMRPN , Γ15,2 = GMRPN ,
Γ15,3 = (1− δ)βG, Γ17,1 = ξMRSΩ and Γ17,2 = (1−ξ)MRPNΩ .
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capital per capita, foreign debt holdings, foreign interest rate, domestic inputs, the price level
of domestic inputs, real rental rate, employment per capita, market average nominal wage,
nominal wage, domestic aggregate price level, output per capita, imports per capita, real
exchange rate, unemployment, investment per capita, exports per capita, the price level of
intermediate goods, costs per hire, the number of new hires, intermediate goods, nominal wage
growth rate, inflation rate, target real wage, marginal rate of substitution, marginal revenue
product of labor, job-finding probability, the fraction of households members searching for
jobs, labor participation rate and the unemployment rate respectively.
As mentioned, this model consists of the same ten exogenous shocks as in the union bargain-
ing model. We have Ân,t, a shock to labor productivity; Ẑt, a shock to total factor productivity
in the final goods production; Âv,t, a shock to the investment-specific technology; ̂m,t, a shock
to import demand; ̂c,t, a shock to the consumption preference; ̂l,t, a shock to the labor supply;
̂x,t, a shock to the foreign demand for Hong Kong exports; P̂ ∗t , a shock to the foreign price
level; R̂∗t , a shock to the US interest rate; and ξ̂f,t, a shock to the risk premium associated
with the foreign debts. The hatted variables represent the percent deviations of the variables
from their respective steady state values, except for ûrt, piwt and pi
P
t which are defined as the
arithmetic deviation from their steady state values.
I define ς̂t = {Âv,t, Ẑt, Ân,t, ̂m,t, ̂c,t, ̂l,t, ̂x,t, P̂ ∗t , R̂∗t , ξ̂f,t} to be a 10× 1 vector of structural
stochastic shocks that cause model variables to deviate from their steady state values. Each
element of ς̂t is assumed to have the following univariate representation:
ς̂i,t = ρς(L)ς̂i,t−1 + si,t
where si,t is the innovation to ς̂i,t and is assumed to be zero-mean, normally distributed and
serially uncorrelated. The structure of the shock process is the same as that in the past chapter.
4.3 Estimation
Given the discrepancy in the labor market structure, the calibration scheme used here
is slightly different from that in the previous chapter. In particular, there are a few new
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parameters in the search-matching model. Again, I divide the model parameters into three
groups.
The first group of parameters includes the capital depreciation rate, δk, the household’s
discount factor, β, the elasticity of export demand with respect to the real exchange rate, η
, the job finding rate, x, the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, ϑ, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and imported inputs in the final goods production function, ν
and the parameter that governs the dependence of foreign rate on the level of foreign debt
holdings, ϕ. I use the values for this group of parameters from other sources. In particular, I
use the conventional value for β, which is equal to 0.99 and set ϕ to 0.0004, the same value
used by Cook and Deveraux (2006b). Setting ϕ to a small value is to ensure the model has a
stationary equilibrium without affecting the responses of the model to shocks at business cycle
frequency.
The job finding rate, x, is set to 0.7, which is consistent to the value used by Boz et al.
(2009) for emerging economies. The parameter, ϑ, is calibrated such that the Frisch elasticity
is equal to 0.001, a value that is in line with the estimate from Cheng and Salemi (2010) for
Hong Kong. As in the previous chapter, I set ν to 0.5 and set the elasticity of export demand
parameter to 2. The depreciation rate, δk, is assumed to be equal to 0.025, a standard value
in the literature.
The second group of parameters includes the value of the scale parameter on labor supply
in the utility function, κ, weight on unemployment in the utility function, ψ, weight on labor
in the production function, α, weight on capital in the production function, θ, weight on
imported inputs, ω, and export demand parameter, x. These parameters are calibrated to
match the steady state values of six variables with their respective sample averages. These six
variables are the ratio of consumption to output, the ratio of investment to output, the ratio
of employee compensation to output, the ratio of imported inputs to output, employment and
the unemployment rate. Given these parameter values, the job separation rate can be found by
using the steady state condition, δ = x1−x
UR
n . The steady state values of the nominal exchange
rate and all exogenous variables are also assumed to be 1 since they are not determined in
the model, with the exception of R∗t and εx,t. Table 4.1 reports the first moments of these six
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variables and Table 4.2 displays the calibrated parameter values.
The third group of the parameters, collected in a vector ζ, consists of parameters that
govern the dynamics of the model. They are estimated by using the maximium likelihood
methods described in the last chapter. This group of parameters includes the firm’s relative
bargaining power parameter, ξ, capital adjustment cost parameter, θk and a set of parameters
that govern the serial correlation properties of the structural shocks.
As in the previous chapter, the following time series are used in the estimation. The series
include the US three month Treasury Bill rate (R̂∗t ), the Hong Kong three month domestic
saving deposits rate (R̂f,t), output per capita (ŷt), labor employment per capita (n̂t), imported
inputs per capita (ŷm,t), the unemployment rate (ûrt), the real exchange rate (Q̂t), the nominal
wage rate (Ŵt), consumption per capita (ĉt) and investment per capita (îvt).
4.3.1 Estimation Results
The estimated values for our parameters and the standard errors for these parameters
are displayed in Table 4.3. Most of the parameters are precisely estimated. The second
lag coefficients of TFP shocks and LP shocks appear to be insignificant and close to zero.
The estimate for the capital adjustment cost parameter is 0.736, which implies that the q
elasticity of investment is around 1.9, a value that is consistent with the reported values in the
q literature.
Furthermore, the estimates for the parameters that govern the dynamics of the structural
shocks show that all exogenous shocks are persistent. The estimates for ρz1and ρz2 indicate
that the largest eignvalue of the process for TFP shock is about 0.96. Thus, the effect of a
shock to TFP is persisent and long-lasting.
The correlations among different structural innovations are displayed in Table 4.4. The
estimates show that some shocks are highly correlated with others. For instance, the foreign
price shocks and the import demand shocks, as well as labor productivity shocks and TFP
shocks, are highly correlated.
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4.3.2 Model Fit
I now determine how well the baseline search model fits the data. Figure 4.1 displays
the actual and predicted values of selected data series from the search model and the union
bargaining model. By looking at the predicted values, it seems that both models fit the data
reasonably well since the predicted values from both models track the actual values closely
over the sample period. However, business cycle statistics comparison tells us a different story.
Table 4.6 illustrates the standard deviations of several key variables and the correlations
from the flexible wage search model and those from the data. The business cycle statistics
of the union bargaining model are also displayed in the table to facilitate comparison. The
volatility of nominal wage generated from the search-matching model is much larger than that
from the actual data. Also, the standard deviations of output, consumption and employment
from the search model are 9.69, 12.97 and 4.73, which are far from those found in the data.
Compared to the search model, the union bargaining model is much more adept at capturing
the second moments of the data.
In fact, the union bargaining model also does a better job in explaining the correlations
in the data. The correlations between output per capita and consumption per capita, output
per capita and unemployment and output per capita and employment implied by the search
model are much weaker than those in the data. By comparing the business cycle statistics, we
can see that a standard search-matching model cannot match the data as well as the union
bargaining model.
4.4 Introducing Wage Rigidity to the Search Model
To further confirm the role of wage rigidity during the Asian crisis, in this section, I
introudce wage stickiness to the search-matching model. The modified model shares a similar
labor market structure with other models in the search and matching literature, for example,
Gertler et al. (2008) and Gali (2010). More specifically, the model uses a Calvo-type wage
setting mechanism to capture wage rigidity. In each period, a new hire can only bargain
with his or her employer over the nominal wage with a fixed probability. If a new worker
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cannot bargain with the firm in period t, he or she receives the same wage as existing workers,
which is equal to the previous period bargained wage indexed to the current inflation. As in
Gertler et al. (2008), wage setting frictions in this model do not affect the existing employment
relationship directly. Wage frictions only change the employment level by influencing firms’
hiring decision. This modified model consists of both search frictions and wage setting frictions,
which provides an excellent environment to determine the importance of wage rigidity relative
to search frictions.
Staggered Nash Bargaining
I modify the baseline search model by assuming that each firm and an individual worker
engage in a staggered Nash bargaining process. Therefore, the wage bargaining problem here
is very similar to the one in the union bargaining model, except that bargaining now takes
place between a firm and an individual worker, rather than an union. Again, let us assume
that firms face a probability ρ of being unable to renegotiate with their workers in each period.
Firms that cannot bargain with their workers in period t index their wages to current inflation,
Wt(i) = Wt−1(i)
(
Pt
Pt−1
)χ
where χ ∈ [0, 1] governs the degree of wage indexation.
Let V Nt+k|t(i) denote the value to the houeshold member in period t+k from an employment
in firm i that last changes its wage in period t. The value to the worker in period t when wage
negotiation takes place in the same period is given by
V Nt|t (i) =
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt|t
Pt
)χ
Pt
−MRSt + EtΛt,t+1[(1− δ)(ρV Nt+1|t(i)
+(1− ρ)V Nt+1|t+1(i)) + δV Ut+1]
where W ∗t (i) denotes the optimal nominal wage bargain chosen by the firm and an employee
in period t and MRSt is the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption.
Workers can search for another job within the same period if negotiation breaks down. Thus,
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the value to the household member from being unemployed is given by
V Ut = xt
∫ 1
0
(
Mt(z)
Mt
)
V Nt (z)dz + (1− xt)
(−ψMRSt + EtΛt,t+1V Ut+1)
Again, V Ut = 0 in an equilibrium with positive non-participations. The surplus to the
worker in period t from forming an employment relation with firm i is:
SHt|t(i) = V
N
t|t (i)− V Ut
=
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt|t/Pt
)χ
Pt
−MRSt + (1− δ)Et
{
Λt,t+1
(
ρSHt+1|t(i) + (1− ρ)SHt+1|t+1(i)
)}
Iterating the above equation forward yields
SHt|t(i) = Et
∞∑
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)k Λt,t+k
(
W ∗t (i) (Pt+k/Pt)
χ
Pt+k
−MRSt+k
)
+(1− δ)(1− ρ)Et
∞∑
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)k Λt,t+k+1SHt+k+1|t+k+1(i)
Next, let V FEt|t (i) denote the value to a firm in period t from establishing an employment
relationship with a worker. V Ft|t(i) is given by
V Ft|t(i) = MRPNt|t(i)−
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt|t/Pt
)χ
Pt
+ (1− δ)Et
{
Λt,t+1
(
ρV Ft+1|t(i) + (1− ρ)V Ft+1|t+1(i)
)}
where MRPNt+k|t(i) ≡ Px,t+kPt+k (1−α)A
1−α
t+k N
−α
t+k|t(i) for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., is the marginal revenue
product of labor given that the nominal wage is last readjusted in period t. On the other hand,
if negotiation breaks down in period t, the firm’s value is zero. Thus, V Nt = 0. As a result,
the firm’s surplus, denoted by SFt|t(i), from establishing an employment relation with a worker
in period t is:
SFt|t(i) = V
F
t|t(i)− V Nt
= MRPNt|t(i)−
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt|t/Pt
)χ
Pt
+(1− δ)Et
{
Λt,t+1
(
ρSFt+1|t(i) + (1− ρ)SFt+1|t+1(i)
)}
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Iterating the equation forward, we obtain
SFt|t = Et
∞∑
k=0
((1− δ) ρ)k Λt,t+k
(
MRPNt+k|t −
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt|t/Pt
)χ
Pt+k
)
+(1− ρ)(1− δ)Et
∞∑
k=0
((1− δ) ρ)k Λt,t+k+1SFt+k+1|t+k+1
Hence, if a firm and a worker are able to negotiate the nominal wage in period t, they solve
the following problem:
max
W ∗t (i)
ξ log
(
SFt|t(i)
)
+ (1− ξ) log
(
SNt|t(i)
)
The optimal Nash bargained wage, W ∗t (i), chosen by the firm and the worker in period t has
to satisfy the following condition
ξSHt|t(i) = (1− ξ)SFt|t(i) (4.7)
Equation (4.7) is the surplus sharing rule, which can be rewritten as
Et
∞∑
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)k Λt,t+k
(
W ∗t (i) (Pt+k/Pt)
χ
Pt+k
− Ωt+k|t(i)
)
= 0
where Ωt+k|t(i) ≡ ξMRSt+k + (1 − ξ)MRPNt+k|t(i) can be interpreted as the target real
wage. Note that all firms and workers that are able to bargain in the same period will select
the same wage, which implies W ∗t (i) = W ∗t . Log-linearizing the equation above gives us the
optimal wage setting rule:
Ŵ ∗t = (1− β(1− δ)ρ)Et∞k=0(β(1− δ)ρ)k
(
Ω̂t+k|t + P̂t+k − χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)
)
The rule shows that the optimal wage responds to the weighted current and future target
wage and the attached weight depends on the rate of job separation and the degree of wage
stickiness.
Relation to the union bargaining model
How does the current wage equation differ from the one we obtain in the union bargaining
model? Remember that the wage equation from the union bargaining model is given by
Ŵ ∗t = (1− βρ)Et∞k=0(βρ)k(ŴRt+k − χ(P̂t+k − P̂t))
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where ŴRt+k = m̂rst+k + P̂t+k.
There are two differences between the two optimal wage equations. First, the discount
factor is smaller in the current wage setting equation. In the current model, each firm and
worker take into account the probability that their employment relationship would be termi-
nated exogenously in the future period when they decide on the optimal wage. On the other
hand, in the union bargaining model, firms and unions maintain their employment relation-
ships as long as the wage contracts stay effective. Second, the optimal wage responds to the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor supply in the union bargaining
model. However, in this model, optimal wage responds to the target wage, which is a function
of the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal revenue product of labor.
Estimation Results
In what follows, I first estimate the sticky wage version of the search model and then
compare the results with the standard search model. In the modified search model, we have
to rewrite the optimal participation condition, (E13) and the wage dynamic equation, E(18)
as the following equations
m̂rst =
1
1− xx̂t + Ĝt − Ξpi
w
t (E13)
and
piwt = β(1− δ)(piwt+1 − χpiPt+1) + χpiPt − λw(Ŵt − P̂t − Ω̂t) (E18)
where Ξ = ξ(W/P )(1−ξ)G
ρ
(1−ρ)(1−β(1−δ)ρ) and λw =
1−ρ
ρ
(1−β(1−δ)ρ)
(1−(1−Υ)(1−Φ)) . It is important to note that
when ρ is set to zero, the search model with sticky wage changes back to the standard search
mdoel.
The introduction of wage stickiness to the search model creates two new parameters: the
wage stickiness parameter, ρ and wage indexing parameter, χ. Therefore, these two parame-
ters, in addition to other structural parameters, will be estimated with maximum likelihood
methods.
Table 4.7 reports the estimates and the respective standard errors. The estimates are
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similar to those from the flexible wage search model. In particular, the estimate of the capital
adjustment cost parameter is almost identical. Table 4.5 displays the loglikelihood values of
both models. By comparing the loglikelihood values, we can see that the sticky wage version
of the model appears to fit the data better.4 The difference in loglikelihood is about 24 points.
This suggests that the staggered wage bargaining mechanism is empirically important for
explaining the Hong Kong data in our search-matching model.
The estimate for the Calvo wage adjustment parameter is 0.91, implying the average dura-
tion of wage agreement in Hong Kong is about 11 quarters. This result is close to the one we
obtained in the prevous chapter when wages are determined by firms and unions. It further
confirms that the wage adjustment process in Hong Kong is very sluggish. Furthermore, the
estimate of the wage indexing parameter is 0.82, which implies a high degree of real wage
rigidity in Hong Kong. Again, the result is consistent with the one from the union bargaining
model.
As we can see from Table 4.6, the volatilities of nominal wages and consumption generated
by the sticky-wage search model are weaker but closer to the actual data than those implied
by the standard search model. This result is not surprising. Adding wage rigidity to the search
model restrains the movements of nominal wages. This leads to a lower wage volatility.
Impulse Response Functions
In this subsection, I simulate the responses of the model to a positive TFP shock, export
demand shock and risk premium shock. I then shut off the wage rigidity by setting ρ = 0 and
simulate the responses of the flexible wage search-matching model.
As in the last chapter, to account for the shock correlations, I assume a within-period causal
effect on the structural innovations by using the Cholesky decomposition of the innovation
covariance matrix. The ordering of the shock innovations remains unchanged. Shocks to the
US interest rate are assumed to be most exogenous while shocks to the labor supply are the
least.
4The likelihood ratio test confirms this result.
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Figure 4.2 displays the impulse responses of selected variables to a one percent total factor
productivity shock. As the figure shows, a positive shock to the TFP raises output, investment
and consumption. Both labor supply and employment drop after the shock. These results are
in line with the predictions from the union bargaining model. The decline in employment is
larger than the fall in labor supply, resulting in an increase in the unemployment rate. A TFP
shock affects employment in both direct and indirect ways. First, a shock to TFP directly
increases the incentive for intermediate-good firms to hire by raising the demand for domestic
inputs. However, the relative price of intermediate goods drops after the shock and causes a
decrease in the marginal revenue product of labor, which leads to a decrease in labor demand.
Also, given that nominal wages are sticky, real wages rise slightly after the shock. This also
dampens firms’ desire to hire new workers. The latter effect dominates so that hiring and
employment both fall after the shock.
Labor supply decreases by less when nominal wages are flexible. A TFP shock has less of a
negative impact on employment when wage rigidity is turned off. Nominal wages show a larger
response to the shock and real wages now fall, instead of rise after the shock. The negative
effect of real wage on the firm’s hiring decision is smaller. As a result, the unemployment rate
now drops after the shock. The impact of wage rigidity on the responses of other variables are
rather trivial.
I now investigate how a positive export demand shock affects the selected variables. Figure
4.3 displays the impluse responses. A positive export demand shock raises output, consumption
and investment directly by increasing aggregate demand. Employment and labor supply also
rise after the shock. The increase in labor supply is larger than the increase in employment
and the unemployment rate drops as a result. Note that the impulse responses of the selected
variables are similar to those from the union bargaining model.
Wage rigidity has a large effect on the responses of employment and labor supply. When
wage rigidity is shut off, nominal wages and real wage show larger responses to the shock. This
reduces firms’ incentives to post new vacancies. As a result, employment rises less after the
shock. The unemployment rate also decreases by less.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the impluse responses to a positive risk premium shock. A positive
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risk premium shock raises the borrowing costs, causing consumption and investment to decline.
Output falls due to the decrease in aggregate demand. The nominal wage is less responsive to
the risk premium shock than the price level due to wage rigidity. As a result, real wage rises
after the shock. A positive risk premium shock also causes labor supply and the unemployment
rate to rise.
When wage rigidity is turned off, nominal wages become more responsive to the shock
and real wages rise less. The negative effect on employment is smaller and, as a result, the
unemployment rate increases by less.
The Effects of the Crisis Shocks
The effect of each structural shock on Hong Kong output after 1997 are displayed in Figure
4.5 and Figure 4.6. Output plummeted by around 19 percent between the third quarter of
1997 and the first quarter of 1999. Most of this drop can be attributed to export demand
shocks. In particular, the model predicts that export demand shocks lower Hong Kong output
by about 10 percent. Shocks to total factor productivity and labor productivity also have
large negative effects on output during the crisis. Moreover, shocks to import demand are also
responsible for the decrease in output.
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 show the effect of different structural shocks on the unemployment
rate. Our analysis indicates that the large increase in the unemployment rate after 1997 is
mainly driven by export demand shocks and labor supply shocks. Shocks to labor productivity
and import demand also have a non-trivial effect on unemployment. On the other hand, the
effect of risk premium shocks on unemployment is negligible. Overall, these findings jibe with
the results from the union bargaining model.
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4.4.1 Counterfactual Experiments
The Role of Nominal Wage Rigidity
Now, let us return to the central question of interest. What can the sticky wage version
of the search-matching model tell us about the effect of wage rigidity during the Asian cri-
sis? As in the previous chapter, I quantify the impacts of wage rigidity by conducting some
counterfactual experiments.
I first shut off the wage rigidity by setting ρ = 0 and then feed the shock estimates to
the model. Figure 4.9 displays the result. The model predicts that the crisis shocks would
cause Hong Kong output to decrease by about 18 percent if nominal wages were perfectly
flexible, compared to the 19 percent fall in the data. This implies that wage frictions are
not responsible for the impact of the crisis on output. On the other hand, as shown in
Figure 4.10, the unemployment rate rises by about 2.5 percent in the model without wage
setting frictions, compared to the 4 percent increase observed in the data. The counterfactural
experiments confirm the result that wage rigidity in Hong Kong accounts for the large rise in
the unemployment rate during the Asian financial crisis.
Counterfactual Exchange Rate Regime
Prior to concluding this dissertation, I use the search-matching model to investigate the
effect of switching to an inflation-targeting regime during the crisis on the Hong Kong economy.
Suppose the central bank of Hong Kong follows a Taylor rule for the domestic interest rate
given by
R̂d,t = φrR̂d,t−1 + (1− φr)φpipit
where R̂d,t and pit are the domestic interest rate and inflation respectively. The interest rate
smoothing parameter φr and inflation parameter, φpi are set to 0.7 and 1.9 respectively, as in
the last chapter. We also have to incorporate the uncovered interest rate parity condition and
modify our log-linear model by rewriting (E5), (E6) and (E29) as
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λ̂t + Ŝt = EtŜt+1 + λ̂t+1 + R̂f,t
Q̂t = Ŝt + P̂ ∗t − P̂t
and
(Rf − 1)Ŝt +Rf D̂∗t−1 +Rf R̂f,t−1 = D̂∗t + Γ6,1P̂t + Γ6,2êxt − Γ6,3(ŷm,t + Q̂t)
respectively.
The estimated crisis shocks are fed to the modified model and the counterfactual paths for
output and the unemployment rate are displayed in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 respectively.
The counterfactural experiments in the search-matching model show that adopting a flexible
exchange rate regime during the Asian crisis would migitate the negative effects of the crisis on
the Hong Kong economy. The rise in the unemployment rate would be milder and the output
drop would be less severe under the inflation targeting regime. Again, the counterfactural
experiments in both the union bargaining model and the search-matching model give us similar
results.
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Table 4.1: Steady State Moments
Description Variable Value
Unemployment rate UR 0.037
Employment n 0.591
Ratio of wage bill to output nw/y 0.292
Ratio of consumption to output c/y 0.498
Ratio of investment to output iv/y 0.181
Ratio of imports to output ym/y 0.306
Table 4.2: Calibrated Parameter Values (Search Model)
Description Parameter Value
Export demand location parameter x 0.320
Weight on unemployment in the utility function ψ 2.521
Weight on capital in the production function θ 0.366
Weight on imports in the production function ω 0.306
Weight on labor in the production function α 0.333
Job separation rate δ 0.090
Figure 4.1: Comparison of Actual Values and Different Model Predictions
Note: The solid lines represent the actual values, the red dashed lines represent the predictions
from the search model and the blue dashed lines represent the predictions from the union model.
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Table 4.3: Estimated Parameter Values (Search Model)
Description Variable Value S.E.
Firm’s Relative Bargaining Power ξ 0.055 0.008
Capital Adj. Cost Parameter θk 0.736 0.011
US Interest Rate Shock
1st Lag ρus1 1.292 0.014
2nd Lag ρus2 -0.363 0.019
Total Factor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρz1 0.962 0.004
2nd Lag ρz2 -0.006 0.008
Labor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρa1 0.963 0.003
2nd Lag ρa2 -0.006 0.008
Risk Premium Shock
1st Lag ρξ1 0.580 0.016
2nd Lag ρξ2 0.192 0.012
Taste Shock
1st Lag ρς1 0.889 0.009
2nd Lag ρς2 0.027 0.006
Import Demand Shock
1st Lag ρm1 0.939 0.009
2nd Lag ρm2 0.007 0.008
Export Demand Shock ρx 0.995 0.003
Foreign Price Shock ρfp 0.938 0.013
Investment-Specific Tech Shock ρv 0.895 0.028
Labor Supply Shock ρl 0.989 0.028
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Table 4.4: Estimated Pair-wise Correlations Among Structural Innovations from the Search
Model
RUS FP EX TFP LP IV RP M C L
RUS 1 -0.23 -0.47 -0.36 -0.34 0.10 0.15 0.31 0.11 0.11
FP 1 0.26 0.96 0.97 0.73 -0.02 -0.99 -0.96 -0.48
EX 1 0.45 0.44 0.31 -0.24 -0.34 -0.03 -0.28
TFP 1 0.99 0.68 -0.07 -0.98 -0.90 -0.50
LP 1 0.70 -0.08 -0.99 -0.90 -0.51
IV 1 0.11 -0.69 -0.66 -0.32
RP 1 0.07 -0.06 0.22
M 1 0.94 0.51
C 1 0.44
L 1
Note: These are structural innovations to RUS, the US interest rate; FP, the foreign price index; EX,
export demand; TFP, total factor productivity; LP, labor productivity; IV, investment technology; RP,
the risk premium; M, import demand; C, consumption preference; and L, labor supply.
Table 4.5: Log-Likelihood (Search-Matching Model)
Sticky Wage Version Flexible Wage Version
3155 3131
Figure 4.2: Impulse Response Functions to a One Percent Shock to Total Factor Productivity
from the Search Model
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Table 4.6: Business Cycle Properties of Different Models
Search (FW) Search (SW) Union Data
Standard Deviation (percent)
Output (y) 9.69 6.31 8.19 7.07
Investment (iv) 12.28 11.28 15.42 9.92
Consumption (c) 12.97 7.86 8.96 5.38
Employment (n) 4.73 3.28 3.63 3.02
Unemployment (U) 2.08 1.59 2.48 1.96
Imports (m) 27.03 18.37 22.17 21.80
Wage Rate (W) 21.22 12.69 11.82 7.91
US Interest Rate (R*) 0.59 0.50 0.48 0.63
Foreign Rate (Rf ) 0.71 0.66 0.70 0.74
Real Exchange Rate (Q) 14.49 10.11 9.05 16.10
Correlations
c, y 0.59 0.61 0.57 0.86
iv, y 0.29 0.66 0.70 0.43
U, y -0.26 -0.49 -0.67 -0.62
n, y 0.03 0.53 0.33 0.31
W, n 0.38 0.23 -0.03 -0.24
W, U -0.35 -0.09 -0.40 0.10
c, iv 0.31 0.40 0.47 0.52
U, n -0.73 -0.60 -0.50 -0.82
Note: FW stands for the flexible wage version of the search model while SW stands for the sticky wage
version.
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Table 4.7: Estimated Parameter Values (Sticky-Wage Search Model)
Description Variable Value S.E.
Firm’s Relative Bargaining Power γ 0.049 0.007
Capital Adj. Cost Parameter θk 0.731 0.339
Calvo Wage Parameter ρ 0.911 0.018
Wage Indexing Parameter χ 0.844 0.133
US Interest Rate Shock
1st Lag ρus1 1.277 0.061
2nd Lag ρus2 -0.393 0.062
Total Factor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρz1 0.854 0.038
2nd Lag ρz2 0.082 0.041
Labor Productivity Shock
1st Lag ρa1 0.861 0.039
2nd Lag ρa2 0.064 0.040
Risk Premium Shock
1st Lag ρξ1 0.601 0.219
2nd Lag ρξ2 0.254 0.182
Taste Shock
1st Lag ρς1 0.674 0.069
2nd Lag ρς2 0.215 0.043
Import Demand Shock
1st Lag ρm1 0.744 0.046
2nd Lag ρm2 0.192 0.045
Export Demand Shock ρx 0.974 0.010
Foreign Price Shock ρfp 0.985 0.015
Investment-Specific Tech Shock ρv 0.894 0.031
Labor Supply Shock ρl 0.980 0.029
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Response Functions to a One Percent Shock to Export Demand from the
Search Model
Figure 4.4: Impulse Response Functions to One Percent Shock to Risk Premium from the
Search Model
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Figure 4.5: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on Output after 1997 (C)
Figure 4.6: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on Output after 1997 (D)
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Figure 4.7: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on the Unemployment Rate after 1997
(C)
Figure 4.8: The Effect of Different Structural Shocks on the Unemployment Rate after 1997
(D)
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Figure 4.9: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on Output from the Search Model
Figure 4.10: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on the Unemployment Rate from the Search Model
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Figure 4.11: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on Output under a Different Policy Regime (from the
Search Model)
Figure 4.12: The Effect of Crisis Shocks on Unemployment under a Different Policy Regime
(from the Search Model)
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The Asian financial crisis had a tremendous impact on the Hong Kong economy. This
dissertation sets out to answer two important questions. First, I ask if nominal wages in Hong
Kong are sticky. Second, I question if the large fall in output and the significant rise in the
unemployment rate during the crisis are related to the wage adjustment process. To answer
these questions, I develop and estimate a small open economy model with unemployment. The
estimate of the wage stickiness parameter, ρ, is equal to 0.92, suggesting that the wage process
in Hong Kong is very sluggish.
By conducting some counterfactual experiments, I show that wage rigidity is responsible
for the large increase in the unemployment rate during the Asian crisis, but not the severe
drop in output. This result comes from the fact that the labor share in Hong Kong is small
and wage costs have a limited impact on prices and output.
However, unemployment can be the result of a slow and complex job searching process. In
the second part of this dissertation, I develop and estimate a standard search-matching model.
I find that a standard search model does not fit the data as well as the union bargaining model.
In particular, it generates too much volatility in wages.
To further investigate the role of wage stickiness in the Hong Kong economy during the
Asian crisis, I incorporate a staggered wage bargaining mechanism into the search model. I find
that it improves the search model’s ability in explaining the Hong Kong data. Wage volatility
implied by the sticky-wage search model is closer to that in the data. I also conduct coun-
terfactual experiments on the sticky-wage search model and find that wage rigidity accounts
for a significant amount of the increase in Hong Kong unemployment during the crisis. This
result provides strong evidence that wage stickiness plays an important role in Hong Kong’s
business fluctuations.
It is important to note that our models are lacking a financial sector, which ought to play
an important role during a financial crisis. Future study can incorporate financial frictions
into the models and investigate whether or not frictions in the financial sector would explain
the large fall in output in Hong Kong after 1997. In addition, the role of wage rigidity in other
financial crises, such as the ”Great Recession” which occured recently in the US, should also
be studied in future research.
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Appendix A
Data
This section of the appendix provides a description of the data series that I use in the
empirical analysis of the Hong Kong economy. The data runs from 1981Q4 to 2007Q3
and is from the data archive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority which is available at
www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/statistics.
The first step in the statistical analysis is to set out a definition of GDP that is compatible
with the model. I define nominal GDP to be the sum of nominal consumption, nominal
domestic fixed capital formation (investment) and nominal exports while I define real GDP as
the sum of real consumption, real investment and real exports. The unit for the real series is
millions of Year 2007 Hong Kong dollars. A substantial fraction of Hong Kong exports are re-
exports, goods that enter Hong Kong’s harbor only to be transferred from one ship to another
and immediately sent on their way. Following Salemi (2007), I define exports to be the sum of
exports of goods and exports of services minus re-exports and imports to be imports of goods
and services minus re-exports. I likewise define real exports and real imports to be the net of
real re-exports. Nominal and real values for consumption, investment, exports, imports and
re-exports are compiled by the Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR).
Several of the statistics used in the calibration are per capita measures. To compute per
capita measures, I divide the magnitude in question by the Hong Kong population of adults
and individuals whose age is greater than 15. The population data is also compiled by the
Census and Statistics Department of HKSAR.
Employment per capita, n, is computed as the ratio of employment to population. Em-
ployment is taken from the data set entitled ”employed persons by hours of work during the
seven days before enumeration and sex.” The unemployment rate, U , is reported by the Census
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and Statistics Department of HKSAR. A person 15 years or older is considered unemployed
if he: has not had a job and has not performed any work for pay in the prior seven days, has
been available for work in the prior 7 days, and has sought work during the prior 30 days.
Discouraged workers and people without a job who have not been available for work due to
temporary illness or people without a job who have not available for work due to anticipated
employment are also considered unemployed. Per capita labor supply is computed as l = n1−U .
Consumption per capita, c, investment per capita, iv, exports per capita, ex and imports
per capita, m, are real consumption, real investment, real exports and real imports divided by
the population of adults respectively. Output per capita, y, is the sum of real consumption,
real investment and real exports divided by the population of adults.
The domestic rate is the Hong Kong three month saving deposits rate and the US interest
rate is the US three month Treasury Bill rate. The real exchange rate is the ratio of the price
of imports to the price of domestically produced goods. To compute this ratio requires four
price indices, the price of consumption goods, the price of investment, the price of exports,
and the price of imports. I compute each of these ratios by dividing nominal values by real
values. I then compute the price of domestically produced goods by averaging the price of
consumption goods, the price of investment and the price of exported goods using as weights
the relative shares of consumption, investment and exports in the total. Finally, we compute
Q as the ratio of the price of imports to the price of domestically produced goods.
To compute the ”wage bill” for Hong Kong, I use the series ”Monthly Average Payroll for
All Industry Groups.” The series covers employees up to and including supervisory personnel
and includes both salaries and bonuses that are typically paid in the first quarter of each year.
To produce a series for annual average employee compensation, I add the monthly figures for
each quarter and multiply the total by 4.0. To compute the ”wage bill,” I multiply average
annual employee compensation and employment. The fraction of GDP accounted for by
wages, g, is the ratio of the resulting wage bill to the sum of nominal consumption, nominal
investment and nominal exports. The real wage rate is then computed as w = gyn .
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Appendix B
Log-Likelihood Function
In this section, I provide the derivation of the likelihood function that appears in the paper.
The short-run model has a VAR(1) solution form
 X̂t
Ŷt
 = D
 X̂t−1
Ŷt−1
+ Fst
where X̂t includes the predetermined variables and the driving forces in the model, Ŷt are the
forward-looking variables and st is a vector of innovations to structural shocks. We assume
st ∼ N(0,Σs), E(sts′w) = 0 ∀t, w such that t 6= w. We let Zt = [X̂t Ŷt]′ denote a vector that
contains all variables. Note that some of the variables in Ẑt are unobservables, thus we need
to divide the variables in Zt into two groups. We call the first group, uvt, as it contains the
unobervables. We call the second group, ovt, as it contains the observables. Since we use ten
series in the estimation, ovt must be a 10× 1 vector. Thus, we can rearrange the order of the
variables appearing in Zt, and the corresponding elements in D. As a result, we transform the
solution into the following form
 uvt
ovt
 =
 G11 G12
G21 G22

 uvt−1
ovt−1
+
 H1
H2
 st
I first set uv0 and ov0 to their unconditional expected values of zero. Then, at t = 1,
we have ov1 = H2 s1, which implies that s1 = (H2)−1ov1, where ov1 is the first observation
from the data. Given s1, we know, uv1 = H1s1. At t = 2, ov2 = G21uv1 + G22ov1 + H2 s2.
Thus, s2 = (H2)−1[ov2−G21uv1−G22ov1] and we know uv2 = G11uv1 +G12ov1 +H1s2. Then
t = H2st is a vector of the reduced form errors. The log likelihood function is:
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−(Tn/2) log(2pi)− (T/2) log(| Σ |)− (1/2)Tt=1′tΣ−1 t
Since we have the estimates of t, we know the MLE or the value of Σ that maximizes the
likelihood is given by
Σ̂ = (1/T )Tt=1̂t̂
′
t
We can replace the actual Σ in the likelihood function with the MLE. The last term in
the log likelihood function becomes
(1/2)Tt=1̂
′
tΣ̂
−1
 ̂t = (1/2)trace
[
T
t=1̂
′
tΣ̂
−1
 ̂t
]
= (1/2)trace
[
T
t=1Σ̂
−1
 ̂t̂
′
t
]
= (1/2)trace
[
Σ̂−1 (T Σ̂)
]
= (1/2)trace(TI)
= Tn/2
The log likelihood function changes to −(Tn/2) log(2pi)− (Tn/2)− (T/2) log(| Σ̂ |). Note
that the estimates of t depends on the parameters in D and F . Let ϑ be a vector which
contains the elements of D and F that we want to estimate. Thus, the log likelihood function
depends on ϑ, and it can be written as
L(ϑ) = −(Tn/2) log(2pi)− (Tn/2)− (T/2) log(| Σ̂ |)
where Σ̂ = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 ̂t(ϑ)̂
′
t(ϑ). This is the same function I present in the paper.
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Appendix C
The Union Bargaining Model
C.1 Steady State
Q = 1, S = 1, P ∗ = 1
R∗ =
1
β
R =
1
β
− (1− δ)
P =
SP ∗
Q
, Pd = P
ω =
ym
y
k
y
=
iv
δy
, α =
k
y
R
µ(1− ω)
µ =
nw
y(1− α)(1− ω) , ε =
1
1− µ
ex
y
= 1− c
y
− iv
y
U =
(1− τ)( x1+x)
1− τ − σ
x =
[
(
γw − 1
γw
− 1)(ε− 1)(α− 1)
]−1
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n =
nw
y
c
w
y
c
, l =
n
1− U
Ψ = (
1
1− U − l)
w
c
(σU + (1− τ)(1− U))
λ =
1
c
w =
[
(1− α)µ( α
(1− α)r )
α
]1/(1−α)
y =
nw
µ(1− α)(1− ω)
yd = (1− ω)y
D∗ = −y(ex
y
− ym
y
)/(1− 1
β
)
C.2 Aggregation
Heterogeneity in the wages paid by the intermediate firms complicates the aggregation pro-
cess. Here, I describe the procedure which transforms the model into one that only comprises
aggregate variables. First, we have the wage equation
Wt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
N(i)
Nt
di
We can write it in the log-linear form
WŴt =
∫ 1
0
WŴt(i)di+
∫ 1
0
WN̂(i)di−WN̂t
or
Ŵt =
∫ 1
0
Ŵt(i)di
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The equation
Wt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)di
exhibits equilibrium dynamics identical to the wage equation listed above up to the first order.
Also, it is well known that the profit-maximizing intermediate goods firm will choose a price
that satisfies the following equation:
Pd,t(i) =
ε
ε− 1
Wt(i)1−αRαt
A1−αt (1− α)
[
1− α
α
]α
Substitutiing the equation above into the intermediate-goods demand equation
Xt(i) = Yd,t
(
Pd,t(i)
Pd,t
)−ε
yields
Xt(i) = Yd,tP εd,t
(
ε
ε− 1
Wt(i)1−αRαt
A1−αt (1− α)
[
1− α
α
]α)−ε
Combining the equation above with equations (3.11) and (3.12) in the paper gives us
equation (3.21) for the aggregate labor employment and equation (3.22) for the aggregate
capital stock.
C.3 Linearization of the Wage Equation
In this subsection, I explain how to obtain the log-linearized wage dynamic equation. The
wage bargaining problem is:
max
W ∗t (i)
(1− γw) log
(
SFt|t
)
+ γw log
(
SLt|t
)
subject to
Kt−1(i) = (αµ)Y
1
ε
d,tXt(i)
µ
(
Rt
Pd,t
)−1
Nt(i) = (1− α)µY
1
ε
d,tXt(i)
µ
(
W ∗t (i)
Pd,t
)−1
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The first order condition is:
Et
∞∑
k=0
ρkΛt,t+k
[
W ∗t (i)
(
Pt+k
Pt
)χ
(1− τ)
]
Nt+k|t(i) =
Ξ
Ξ− 1Et
∞∑
k=0
ρkΛt,t+kWRt+kNt+k|t(i)
where Ξ ≡ γw−1γw (ε− 1)(α− 1)− α(ε− 1) + ε. Log-linearizing the equation above gives us the
optimal wage equation
Ŵ ∗t = (1− βρ)Et∞j=0(βρ)j(ŴRt+j − χ(P̂t+j − P̂t))
To obtain the wage dynamic equation, we first log-linearize the aggregagte nominal wage
equation, which then takes the form
Ŵt = ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) + (1− ρ)Ŵ ∗t
Combining the equation above with the optimal wage equation yields
Ŵt − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) = (1− ρ)(1− βρ)Et∞j=0(βρ)jŴRt+j − χ(P̂t+j − P̂t)
When both sides are multiplied by 1− βρL−1, where L is a lag operator, LHS becomes
= Ŵt − βρŴt+1 − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) + βρρ(Ŵt + χ(P̂t+1 − P̂t))
= (1 + βρρ)Ŵt + βρρχ(P̂t+1 − P̂t)− βρŴt+1 − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1))
and RHS becomes
= (1− ρ)(1− βρ)Et
∑∞
j=0
(βρ)jŴRt+j − χ(P̂t+j − P̂t)
−(1− ρ)(1− βρ)Et
∑∞
j=0
(βρ)j+1ŴRt+j+1 − χ(P̂t+j+1 − P̂t+1)
= (1− ρ)(1− βρ)(ŴRt − χP̂t) + (1− ρ)χP̂t − (1− ρ)βρχP̂t+1
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By combining the LHS with the RHS, we obtain the nominal wage dynamic equation as
follows:
(1 + βρρ)Ŵt − βρŴt+1 − ρŴt−1 + βρχP̂t+1 − (ρ+ βρ)χP̂t + ρχP̂t−1 = (1− ρ)(1− βρ)ŴRt
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Appendix D
The Search-Matching Model
D.1 Steady State
Q = 1, S = 1, P ∗ = 1
R∗ =
1
β
rk =
1
β
− (1− δk)
P =
SP ∗
Q
, Pd = P
ω =
Ym
Y
K
Y
=
I
δY
F =
N
UR
, U = F −N
δ =
x
1− x
U
N
Uo =
U
1− x
M = δN
L = N + ψU
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λ =
1
c
Yx = N1−α
Rk
Pd
=
θYd
K
Px
Pd
=
(1− θ)Yd
Yx
W
P
= MRS +
1− ξ
ξ
δG
Γ = Gx−γ
EX
Y
= 1− C
Y
− I
Y
− GM
Y
D∗ = −Y (EX
Y
− Ym
Y
)/(1− 1
β
)
D.2 Linearization of the Wage Equation
Here, I derive the log-linearized wage growth equation, E(18), in the search-matching
model. The Nash bargaining problem is as follows
max
W ∗t (i)
(1− γw) log
(
SFt|t
)
+ γw log
(
SLt|t
)
The first order condition is:
Et
∞∑
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)k Λt,t+k
(
W ∗t (i) (Pt+k/Pt)
χ
Pt+k
− Ωt+k|t
)
= 0
Log-Linearizing the equation above yields
Ŵ ∗t = (1− β(1− δ)ρ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(β(1− δ)ρ)k
(
Ω̂t+k|t + P̂t+k − χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)
)
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To find Ω̂t+k|t, we first need to note that
Px
Pt
(1− α)A1−αNt(i) = Wt(i)
Pt
+Bt
where Bt ≡ Gt − (1− δ)EtΛt,t+1G. Log-linearizing the equation above gives us
P̂x − P̂t + (1− α)ât − αn̂t(i) = (1− Φ)(Ŵt(i)− P̂t) + ΦB̂t
where Φ = BW/P +B. In aggregate variable terms, we have
P̂x − P̂t + (1− α)ât − αn̂t = (1− Φ)(Ŵt − P̂t) + ΦB̂t
Combining the two equations above yields
α(nt(i)− nt) = −(1− Φ)(Wt(i)−Wt)
This implies
α(n̂t+k|t − n̂t+k) = −(1− Φ)(Ŵ ∗t + χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)− Ŵt+k)
Since Ω̂t+k|t = Υm̂rst+k + (1−Υ)m̂rpnt+k|t, this implies
Ω̂t+k|t − Ω̂t+k = (1−Υ)(m̂rpnt+k|t − m̂rpnt+k)
= (1−Υ)(m̂rpnt+k|t − m̂rpnt+k)
= −(1−Υ)α(n̂t+k|t − n̂t+k)
= (1−Υ)(1− Φ)(Ŵ ∗t + χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)− Ŵt+k)
As a result,
Ω̂t+k|t = Ω̂t+k + (1−Υ)(1− Φ)(Ŵ ∗t + χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)− Ŵt+k)
Ŵ ∗t = (1− β(1− δ)ρ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(β(1− δ)ρ)k[Ω̂t+k
+(1−Υ)(1− Φ)(Ŵ ∗t + χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)− Ŵt+k) + P̂t+k − χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)]
After rearranging terms, we have
Ŵ ∗t = (1− β(1− δ)ρ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(β(1− δ)ρ)k(Ŵt+k − χ(P̂t+k − P̂t))
− 1− β(1− δ)ρ
1− (1−Υ)(1− Φ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(β(1− δ)ρ)k(Ŵt+k − P̂t+k − Ω̂t+k)
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The aggregagte nominal wage equation takes the form
Ŵt = ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) + (1− ρ)Ŵ ∗t
Combining the equation above with the optimal wage equation yields
Ŵt − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) = (1− ρ)(1− βρ)Et
∞∑
j=0
(βρ)jŴRt+j − χ(P̂t+j − P̂t)
Ŵt − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) = (1− ρ)(1− β(1− δ)ρ)Et
∞∑
k=0
(β(1− δ)ρ)k[Ŵt+k
−χ(P̂t+k − P̂t)− (Ŵt+k − P̂t+k − Ω̂t+k)1− (1−Υ)(1− Φ) ]
When both sides are multiplied by 1− β(1− δ)ρL−1, where L is a lag operator, LHS becomes
= Ŵt − β(1− δ)ρŴt+1 − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1)) + β(1− δ)ρρ(Ŵt + χ(P̂t+1 − P̂t))
= (1 + β(1− δ)ρρ)Ŵt + β(1− δ)ρρχ(P̂t+1 − P̂t)− β(1− δ)ρŴt+1 − ρ(Ŵt−1 + χ(P̂t − P̂t−1))
and RHS becomes
= (1− ρ)(1− β(1− δ)ρ)
[
Ŵt − χP̂t − 11− (1−Υ)(1− Φ)
(
Ŵt − P̂t − Ω̂t
)]
+(1− ρ)χP̂t − (1− ρ)β(1− δ)ρχP̂t+1
By combining the LHS with the RHS, we obtain the nominal wage dynamic equation as follows:
Wt −Wt−1 = β(1− δ)(EtWt+1 −Wt) + χ(Pt − Pt−1)− β(1− δ)χ(EtPt+1 − Pt)
−(1− ρ)(1− β(1− δ)ρ)
ρ(1− (1−Υ)(1− Φ))
(
Ŵt − P̂t − Ω̂t
)
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which implies
piwt = β(1− δ)Etpiwt+1 + χ(pipt )− β(1− δ)χ(Etpipt )
−(1− ρ)(1− β(1− δ)ρ)
ρ(1− (1−Υ)(1− Φ))
(
Ŵt − P̂t − Ω̂t
)
D.3 Linearization of Optimal Participation Condition
The participation condition is given by
ψMRSt =
xt
1− xt
∫ 1
0
(
Mt(z)
Mt
)
SHt (z)dz
Following Gali (2010), I define zt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Mt(z)
Mt
)
SHt (z)dz. We then have
zt '
∫ 1
0
SHt (z)dz
= (1− ρ)
∑∞
q=0
ρqSHt|t−k
= (1− ρ)
∑∞
q=0
ρq
(
SHt|t + S
H
t|t−q − SHt|t
)
Combining the equation above with Nash bargaining condition, we have
ξzt = ξSHt|t + ξ(1− ρ)
∑∞
q=0
ρq(SHt|t−q − SHt|t)
= (1− ξ)Gt + ξ(1− ρ)
∑∞
q=0
ρq(SHt|t−q − SHt|t)
Note that
SHt|t−q − SHt|t = Et
∑∞
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)kΛt,t+k
(
W ∗t−q(Pt+k/Pt−q)χ
Pt+k
− W
∗
t (Pt+k/Pt)
χ
Pt+k
)
= Et
∑∞
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)kΛt,t+k
(
W ∗t−q(Pt+k/Pt−q)χ −W ∗t (Pt+k/Pt)χ
Pt+k
)
=
W ∗t−q(Pt+k/Pt−q)χ −W ∗t
Pt
Et
∑∞
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)kΛt,t+k
(
Pt(Pt+k/Pt)χ
Pt+k
)
Using the dynamic equation for aggregate wage, we can write
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(1− ρ)
∑∞
q=0
ρqSHt|t−q − SHt|t =
Wt −W ∗t
Pt
Et
∑∞
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)kΛt,t+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)χ−1
= −piwt
(
ρ
1− ρ
)
Wt−1
Pt
Et
∑∞
k=0
((1− δ)ρ)kΛt,t+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)χ−1
' −piwt
(
ρ
(1− ρ)(1− β(1− δ)ρ
)
W
P
This implies
ξzt = (1− ξ)Gt − ξpiwt
(
ρ
(1− ρ)(1− β(1− δ)ρ
)
W
P
In log-linear form is
ẑt = Ĝt − Ξpiwt
where Ξ = ξ(W/P )(1−ξ)G
ρ
(1−ρ)(1−β(1−δ)ρ) .
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